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ABSTRACT
In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that
a California regulation that gave union organizers limited access to
agricultural worksites amounted to a per se taking. The Court went on to
opine that any governmental grant of physical access, no matter how
time-limited or functionally constrained, similarly works a per se taking,
unless one of the Court’s exceptions applies. This essay argues that Cedar
Point is best understood as part of an implicit takings apparatus designed
to selectively apply scrutiny to property-facing governmental acts in
ways that broadly entrench status quo patterns of property wealth. The
Court has effectively constructed an escape room, a gratuitously
convoluted analytic environment, that allows it to crack down on
disfavored property regulations while giving a free pass to favored ones
such as zoning. There is a vulnerability in the Court’s approach, however,
if the goal is to knock out unwanted impositions on property owners: the
Takings Clause allows the government to simply pay for what it takes.
Thus, the Court’s elaborate escape room comes with a lighted exit sign
located right above the cash register. And the amounts in question will
often be trivial. Thus, for all its exclusion-fetishizing rhetoric, Cedar
Point’s bark may prove worse than its bite.
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Escape Room: a game in which participants confined to a room or
other enclosed setting (such as a prison cell) are given a set amount of
time to find a way to escape (as by discovering hidden clues and solving
a series of riddles or puzzles) – Merriam-Webster Dictionary
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INTRODUCTION
In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,1 the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that
a California regulation that gave union organizers limited access to
agricultural worksites (three hours a day, 120 days a year)2 amounted
to a per se taking. The Court further opined that any governmental
grant of physical access, no matter how time-limited or functionally
constrained, similarly works a per se taking—unless one of the Court’s
exceptions applies.3 This essay argues that Cedar Point’s new per se rule
and its various ill-defined exceptions are best understood as part of an
ongoing campaign by the Court to selectively apply heightened scrutiny
in the land use arena in ways that broadly entrench and maintain status
quo patterns of property wealth.4 Threats to the status quo can come
not only from government-imposed burdens on private property, but
also from any weakening of the vast regulatory matrix through which
the government protects existing property wealth.5 Managing both
threats requires some means of dialing scrutiny of governmental acts
up and down at will.6
Cedar Point advances this objective by devising a new per se takings
contraption and throwing physical impositions on owners into it
wholesale, along with various bewildering means of possible
extrication. Implicit takings7 has now effectively become an escape

1. 594 U.S. ___ (2021); 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
2. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8 §20900(e)(1)(C)(2020). The regulation was promulgated by
California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Board pursuant to California’s Agricultural Labor
Relations Act of 1975, Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§1140 et seq.
3. Cedar Point, 141 S.Ct. at 2074–75.
4. For elaboration on this notion of status quo preservation and discussion of its interaction
with the aims of the Takings Clause, see infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 S. CT. REV.
287, 287 (2014) (describing the challenge faced by a Court attempting to protect property owners
both “from state power and with state power”); Daniel A. Farber, Murr v. Wisconsin and the
Future of Takings Law, 2017 S. CT. REV. 115, 154 (“A radical expansion of property rights would
put much of [zoning’s] legal infrastructure in doubt or invalidate it completely.”).
6. Notably, this cannot be done by simply beefing up the multi-factor test that the Court
articulated in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See text
accompanying notes 27–29, infra (describing this test). The Court cannot make Penn Central
significantly more demanding without endangering its own zoning precedents, which are
premised on tolerating very large diminutions of value. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 372
U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning scheme that diminished the value of some parcels of land by
75%).
7. I use the term “implicit takings” here, following James Krier and Stewart Sterk, to refer
to all government acts that constitute takings (for which just compensation must be paid) that do
not occur explicitly through the exercise of eminent domain. See James E. Krier & Stewart E.
Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 40–41 (2016); see also
infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of this terminology).

FENNELL_4_9_22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

4

5/6/2022 11:11 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

room—a gratuitously convoluted analytic environment, filled with
many traps and puzzles.8 Using this apparatus, the Court can crack
down on disfavored impositions on owners while continuing to give a
free pass to favored property regulations like zoning. Although Cedar
Point makes little sense as part of an analytically coherent system for
assessing when burdens on owners have gone “too far,”9 it works well
as part of a selective scrutiny machine—one designed to preserve
restrictions that broadly conserve the established interests of
landowners while scrutinizing and financially burdening any property
impositions that do otherwise.
There is a vulnerability in the Court’s approach, however, if the true
goal is to knock out unwanted impositions on property owners: the
Takings Clause allows the government to simply pay for what it takes.
Thus, the Court’s elaborate escape room comes with a lighted exit sign,
located right above the cash register. And the amounts in question will
often be trivial. By my back-of-the-envelope calculations, for example,
California might keep its labor access law in place for less than $5 per
year per grower.10 Thus, for all its exclusion-fetishizing rhetoric, Cedar
Point’s bark may be worse than its bite.
This essay proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a guided tour of
the implicit takings escape room as it now stands, along with some
guesses as to how unresolved details may be filled in and where things
might go next. Here, I take Cedar Point at face value and attempt to
trace the logical implications of the decision as written.
Part II reframes Cedar Point as part of a selective scrutiny
machine—one that is less concerned with delivering coherent doctrinal
guidance than with applying selective pressure and relief to propertyfacing governmental acts. After examining what purposes this
apparatus might serve and how well those goals square with the Takings
Clause, I map out its functioning, and then turn to the question of
remedies. Throughout, I will focus on real property, leaving aside issues
uniquely presented by personal property and intellectual property.

8. For a similar characterization, see Dan Farber, The Illusions of Takings Law,
LEGALPLANET (July 1, 2021), https://legal-planet.org/2021/07/01/the-illusions-of-takings-law/.
9. This formulation is from Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) “[E]ach of these [takings] tests focuses directly upon
the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights.”).
10. See text accompanying notes 215–216, infra.
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I. TOURING THE ESCAPE ROOM
Let’s start our tour at the information desk with a short briefing
about how we got here, and some provisional maps to guide our way.
We will then turn to the various features of the implicit takings escape
room itself.
A. Orientation
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, ends with the Takings
Clause: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.”11 This clause most obviously places limits on the
government’s eminent domain power by requiring that it be exercised
for public use and that just compensation be paid. But for the past
century, the clause has also been read to require compensation for
governmental acts that, although they are not explicit exercises of
eminent domain, nonetheless burden property in ways that are deemed
to be functionally equivalent.12 When government, although acting in
a legitimate capacity, goes “too far” in imposing on property rights, it
must “pay[] for the change.”13 These compensable impositions were
historically termed “regulatory takings,” but are now more clearly and
neutrally described by the term “implicit takings.”14
1. The Way Things Were
The field of implicit takings has long been described as muddled.15
Yet its basic framework had remained relatively stable for the twentynine-year period running from June 1992, when the Court decided
11. U.S. Const. amend. V.
12. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (observing that all of the takings
tests developed by the Court “share a common touchstone” in attempting “to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”).
13. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16.
14. See supra note 7. In addition to being literally underinclusive (not all property-burdening
governmental acts are regulations), the term “regulatory taking” is now treated by the Court as a
legal conclusion that refers not to an act’s ultimate compensability but rather to the type of
scrutiny to which it should be subjected. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072
(2021) (distinguishing the per se analysis associated with “physical” takings—even when the
appropriation is accomplished through a regulation—from the analysis applicable to “regulatory
takings”). It is therefore useful to have a less freighted term for referring to the entire doctrinal
area dealing with instances in which the government allegedly commits a taking without invoking
the apparatus of eminent domain.
15. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings,
28 STAN. ENVT’L L.J. 525 (2009).
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,16 to June 2021, when the
Court decided Cedar Point. Because the core features of this analytic
framework have been recounted in copious detail elsewhere, I provide
just a brief overview here.
Under the old regime, there were two per se rules, both fairly
narrow, that could automatically make something an implicit taking: if
it worked a permanent physical occupation, or if it deprived the owner
of all economically beneficial use of the property.17 The first of these
rules invited some definitional quibbles about each of its key terms
(“permanent,” “physical,” and “occupation”) but remained wellbounded by them. Loretto v. Teleprompter, the case establishing this
rule, held that a legal requirement that owners endure the permanent
placement of cable wires and boxes on their facades and rooftops
worked a per se taking.18 Notably, the size of the physical occupation
was irrelevant to the takings inquiry, bearing only on the appropriate
amount of just compensation.19
The second per se rule, the “total taking” concept established in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,20 generated larger conceptual
difficulties. It is impossible to say whether “all” of something has been
taken without defining the thing in question— all of what?21 The Court
revisited this so-called “denominator problem” in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, which stated
that the denominator is not defined by the time slice affected by a
temporary measure like a moratorium on building,22 and, more recently,
in Murr v. Wisconsin, which created a multi-factor test for deciding what
denominator should apply in cases involving land.23
Lucas also laid out a powerful per se defense. If the government
action in question was merely carrying out “background principles”—
inherent limits on title—then it could not be a taking because the owner

16. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (setting out these per se rules).
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19. See id. at 436–37 (“[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot
be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.”) (footnote omitted).
20. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
21. For example, if one of two adjacent lots is rendered valueless by a governmental action,
has “all” value been eliminated, or only half? The answer depends on whether the property
interest in question is defined as the individual lot or as the combined set of two lots. See Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (recognizing this “denominator” problem).
22. 535 U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002).
23. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017).
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never had that right to start with.24 This generated a baseline problem:
what counts as a background principle? Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority in Lucas, made clear that he meant to refer to something more
deeply rooted in the common law than harm prevention, with nuisance
law serving as the prototypical example.25 The Court later held in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island that the fact a law was in place when the
landowner took title does not transform it into a background principle
that would preclude his challenging it as a taking.26 But the outer
bounds of the concept remained hazy.
If the above per se rules didn’t provide an answer, the alleged taking
would be assessed under the three-factor test established in Penn
Central Transportation v. City of New York—a pliable inquiry that
examines (1) the economic impact on the landowner; (2) the degree of
interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the government action.27
Although the Penn Central Court provided little guidance about the
meaning of these terms, it illustrated the “character” factor by stating
that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”28
The idea of “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life”
connects conceptually with the more demanding notion of “average
reciprocity of advantage” that has long weighed against finding a
taking.29 The “physical invasion” fork of the Court’s comparison was
24. For example, no one has a right to commit a nuisance on their land, so statutes that do
no more than control common law nuisances are not takings. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30; see
also infra Part I.B.3 (examining the Court’s “background principles” exception in more detail).
25. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026–31.
26. 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001).
27. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
28. 438 U.S. at 124 (internal citation omitted).
29. Justice Holmes used the phrase “average reciprocity of advantage” in Mahon to
distinguish a case in which coal companies were required to leave a column of coal in place
between mines in order to protect workers from flooding in the adjacent mine. 260 U.S. at 415
(distinguishing Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914)). He had used the phrase two
months earlier in a case involving a defendant’s removal, under state law authority, of an unsafe
party wall constructed by the plaintiffs. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
Although longstanding, average reciprocity is far from self-explanatory (what are the relevant
benefits and burdens, at what level of generality?). In general, the more immediately and directly
a regulation returns reciprocal benefits to the burdened landowner, the less likely it will be to
count as a taking, other things being equal. But fully reciprocal benefits are clearly not necessary
to avoid a finding of a taking. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the historic preservation legislation at issue in the case, which was held not be a taking, failed
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revisited four years later in Loretto, which partially replaced the multifactor analysis with a per se rule for permanent physical occupations.30
But the physicality of a governmental burden remained potentially
relevant under the “character” prong of Penn Central whenever
something short of a permanent occupation was involved.
This regime held until Cedar Point, which made all physical
invasions presumptively subject to a per se rule (with various
exceptions), while leaving in place (for now) the pre-existing rules for
assessing restrictions on land use. These developments will be
examined in much more detail below. For present purposes, it is enough
to have absorbed the main features of the old regime, which are
summarized in Figure 1.31

to provide landowners with reciprocal benefits). Nor will average reciprocity preclude a finding
of a taking if, for example, physical occupation is involved. See Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S.
419, 441 (1982) (holding that any permanent physical occupation by the government or a
government-authorized third party is a per se taking).
30. 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
31. This is a flow chart I created for teaching purposes and used for many years in my 1L
Property classes. For case law support for the components of the chart, see supra notes 17–30 and
accompanying text. The arrangement of the components is based on my reading of the case law
and my own view of how the pieces fit together.
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Figure 1: Guide to Implicit Takings Before Cedar Point

Although this framework is no one’s model of clarity, it was a sturdy
structure that managed, however inelegantly, to accommodate most of
what came along in recent decades without the need for major
structural renovations.32
However, a strange and poorly theorized annex to this structure—
exactions—lurked ominously in the corner, its role in the story not yet
well defined. Conceived as a “special application” of the

32. Although there have been a number of takings cases that refined aspects of this
framework, the only major structural change in the last twenty years was the Court’s excision
from takings analysis of the question whether a regulation “substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests”—a means-ends formulation from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980), that the Court removed from its takings analysis in Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 540–
45 (2005).
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine,33 the Court’s exactions
jurisprudence began in 1987 with Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.34 In that case, a landowner who wished to build a larger
beach house was told he could do so only if he opened up a walking
path across his oceanfront property. The Court held that this bargain
violated the Constitution because it required the landowner to trade
away his right to just compensation (which, by assumption, he would
have been entitled to receive had the government simply appropriated
an easement across his land) for something that lacked an “essential
nexus” to the impacts that animated the initial restriction on
rebuilding.35 The rebuilding ban was designed to maintain “visual
access” to the beach, whereas the walking path would provide actual
access—an insufficiently tight connection, the Court held, making the
deal “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”36
The 1994 case of Dolan v. City of Tigard added a requirement of
“rough proportionality” between the impacts justifying the initial
restriction and the concession required to lift it.37 There, the
landowner’s permit to expand her plumbing store, which would
increase traffic and runoff, was conditioned on providing land to the
government in the form of a bike path and a greenbelt drainage area.
These conditions satisfied essential nexus, the Court held, but not rough
proportionality: the city made no showing of how much the traffic and
runoff would be increased by the expansion, or how much the
concessions of land would do to absorb it.38 This level of scrutiny is
quite unusual; typically, the government does not bear the burden of
justifying its acts in such detail.39 Yet because both Nollan and Dolan
33. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
34. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). However, an intriguing precursor in the form of a far more lenient
test appeared in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984). See infra notes 128–132
and accompanying text.
35. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
36. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)).
37. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). As an attorney for the State and Local Legal Center, I worked
on an amicus brief filed on behalf of the National Association of Counties et al. in Dolan. My
academic work on exactions began several years later and has always reflected only my own views.
38. Id. at 395 (“[O]n the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating
that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner’s development
reasonably relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
easement.”).
39. See id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court has made a serious error by
abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof
on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan.”); id. at 413 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t appears that the Court has placed the burden of producing evidence of
relationship on the city, despite the usual rule in cases involving the police power that the
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involved explicit concessions of real property (permanent, continuous
public access to specific pieces of land), exactions doctrine remained
rather limited in scope.40
That changed in 2013, with Koontz v. St. John’s River Water
Management District.41 There, the Court held that exactions scrutiny
applied to an alleged demand that the landowner, who wished to
develop property containing wetlands, either put more of it under a
conservation easement or pay for mitigation efforts to be performed
on other land. Because exactions analysis is triggered only when the
concession in question would be a taking on its own (or else the
predicate of trading away one’s constitutional right to compensation
would be absent), Koontz further held, contra precedent, that any
payment “linked to a specific, identifiable, property interest” counts as
a per se taking—unless, of course, it is the sort of tax or fee that doesn’t
amount to a taking at all.42
This same pattern of announcing a broad per se rule to reach
unwanted governmental actions, coupled with exceptions meant to
immunize all the legal features that the Court wishes to preserve intact,
is repeated in Cedar Point. And importantly, exactions crop up in Cedar
Point as one of the enumerated exceptions to the Court’s new per se
rule.
2. Where We Are Now
Figure 2 represents an attempt to construct an updated flow chart
for implicit takings, post-Cedar Point.43 As a comparison between the
two figures suggests, implicit takings has gotten a good bit more
complicated. Although one of the changes depicted in the chart was
ushered in by Koontz (the monetary exactions on the right-hand
branch of the analysis), Cedar Point brought exactions directly into the
government is presumed to have acted constitutionally.”); see also Fennell & Peñalver, supra note
4, at 293–94 (observing that the Court’s exactions test “invert[s] the traditional presumption of
constitutionality of properly enacted regulations”).
40. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (“Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth
Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government
demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a
condition of obtaining a development permit.”).
41. 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
42. Id. at 614–16; see id. at 623–30 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reasoning
on this point).
43. I created Figure 2 based on my reading of Cedar Point as it interacts with prior implicit
takings doctrine. For analysis and citations supporting the contents of the boxes and the
connections between them, see infra Parts I.B and C.
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implicit takings analysis in a way that is likely to increase recourse to
this mode of reasoning on both the physical and use restriction sides.
Figure 2: The New Implicit Takings Flow Chart

There is much to quibble with in this chart, from formatting to
wording, and I do not recommend it to anyone as a teaching tool. But
laying out the components of the analysis in this manner allows us to
attempt a better, functional remapping of the terrain once we have
worked through its features. Like the Secret Passages that connect the
opposite-corner rooms on the Clue game board, different paths often
lead to the same analytic place, which may appear in more than one
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spot in the chart. If the point of the structure is, as I argue, to selectively
apply scrutiny rather than to generate predictable answers, these modes
of analysis, and the various pathways to them, should be our central
concern. Nonetheless, we can use this provisional map to get started.
3. Two Doors
As we enter the escape room, we encounter two doors that lead into
different sectors. One is marked “physical” and the other “use
restrictions.” The floor plan used to be a bit more open, but Cedar Point
heavily reinforced the dividing wall between these two realms.44 So our
first choice point is determining which sector we’re in. Luckily, this part
seems fairly easy, at least when we’re talking about real property (as I
will be in this essay).
Does the challenged action involve physical access by the
government or a third party, for any period, no matter how brief, or
allow or require any object owned by the government or a third party,
no matter how small, to enter or remain on the property of the
landowner? In other words, does the challenged government action in
any way impinge on the owner’s “right to exclude”? If the answer is
“yes,” then we go on into the “physical” room. We’ll head there first. If,
instead, the challenged action only restricts the owner’s ability to use
or benefit from her own land holding, without anyone or anything
physically crossing her property line, then we’d go into the “use
restrictions” room, which we’ll check out later.45
B. Physical Takings
All right! Here we are in the “physical” sector of implicit takings.
Thanks to Cedar Point, everything that happens in here might (or might
not) be a per se taking. There are lots of people milling around in here,
from meat inspectors to labor organizers, along with seeing eye dogs,
cable boxes, and much, much more. Not to mention all the people who
are protected by antidiscrimination laws, rent control laws, and so on
and so forth. It’s crowded! But not to worry—several escape hatches
await. The Court enumerates three exceptions to its new per se rule in

44. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071–72 (2021) (sharply
distinguishing “physical appropriations” from “use restrictions”). Below, however, I will raise
some questions about whether this wall is really as stable as it first appears. See infra Parts I.B.5
and I.C.4.
45. See infra Part I.C.
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Cedar Point: isolated trespasses, background principles, and exactions.46
It also alludes to another broad exception to the per se rule, where the
land in question is open to the public.47 With those clues in hand, we
can start looking for ways out.48
1. The Open Door
Perhaps the simplest way for the government to escape liability for
a per se physical taking is to establish that the landowner actually
invited the intrusion. A property owner’s right to exclude has always
been conditioned by the owner’s choice to “open the door.” As James
Penner has emphasized, property works like “a gate, not a wall.”49 To
invite someone in is not a violation of your property rights but rather
an instantiation of them. This logic holds even if the party invited in is
the government, or someone whose presence is authorized by the
government.50
But what if you mean to open up your door just so much—for some
people or uses and not others? In distinguishing PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins,51 a case involving a state constitutional right to leaflet
in a private shopping mall, the Court indicated that Cedar Point’s new
per se rule does not apply to property that is open to the general public,
although it did not explain why.52 The Court also included a cf. cite to
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,53 a case that rejected a takings
challenge to civil rights laws that forbid discrimination in public
accommodations.54 Apparently, then, a government access requirement
does not work a per se taking if the owners have opened up the
property to the public at large—even if the owners would prefer to
exclude some people or uses.55
46. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2078–80.
47. Id. at 2076–77 (distinguishing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
48. As we will see, “out” may not lead to a no-takings conclusion, but rather to some further
layer of scrutiny. Thus, the treatment that a particular physical incursion will receive depends not
just on whether an exception applies, but also on which exception is thought to apply.
49. J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 744
(1996).
50. There is a caveat: if the door is opened in exchange for some benefit that the government
provides to the landowner, then this might be analyzed as an exaction, as explained below. See
infra Part I.B.4.
51. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
52. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. 2076–77. The theory might be that once the person has been
invited as part of the public, limits on their activity can be overridden without implicating the right
to exclude, although this argument has some serious weaknesses. See infra Part I.B.5.
53. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
54. Id., cited in Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.
55. It might, however, still be a Penn Central taking. Notably,the access requirement in
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What if you are a property owner who has not opened up your
property to the entire public, but rather only to a subset of nonowners?
Cedar Point provides definitive guidance where the subset in question
consists of your own workers—at least when they live off-site, as was
the case for the growers who challenged the California labor
regulation.56 The case thus stands for the property owner’s right to open
the door just to the workers themselves, without any obligation to
admit anyone else by virtue of having admitted those workers (unless
some other exception applies).
Now let’s consider what happens when a property owner opens the
door to her tenants, or to workers who will live on her property. Here,
we might look to Yee v. City of Escondido, which upheld an ordinance
that protected mobile home residents against rent increases imposed
by the owner of the mobile home park.57 In an opinion by Justice
O’Connor, the Court rejected the park owners’ characterization of the
situation as one of physical occupation, observing that “[p]etitioners
voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners,” and that the
“tenants were invited by petitioners, not forced upon them by the
government.”58 The rent control law was thus treated as a regulation of
the use of land, not a physical invasion of it.
Significantly, the Yee Court reached this conclusion even though the
tenants were allowed to remain for less rent than the owners wanted to
charge, and could only be evicted if the owners wished to change the
land use and provided six to twelve months of notice.59 Hewing to Yee,
it might seem that there is no per se physical taking associated with
regulating the landlord-tenant relationship in ways that enable the
tenant (or any other initially authorized resident) to remain in place for
a longer time or on terms different from those the landlord
contemplated. It seems possible, even likely, that the Court might revisit
Yee in a future case and impose some limits on this form of the opendoor argument.60 But for now, the initial invitation may work to
PruneYard itself was analyzed under Penn Central (before the Court concluded that it was not a
taking), and it seems unlikely that the Court meant to undo this backstop in Cedar Point. See
infra Part I.B.5.
56. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2069–70 (observing that none of the workers employed at
Cedar Point Nursery or at Fowler Packing Company resided on the property).
57. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
58. Id. at 527–28.
59. See id.
60. A possible hint in this direction appears in the Court’s recent per curiam opinion striking
down the CDC’s August 2021 eviction moratorium. Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services, 594 U.S. __ (2021). The decision, rendered by the same six-justice majority
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preclude application of a per se rule in similar situations.
Could this same open-door theory be extended to laws granting
access to people who are associated with a tenant, such as guests,
medical workers, lawyers, health assistants, or even union organizers?
The answer is unclear. If so, it could neatly accommodate past labor law
cases like NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, which suggested that union
access would be permissible—without compensation—where workers
live at the worksite and there is no other realistic way for organizers to
reach them.61 This approach would also avoid disturbing the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Shack, which recognized
limits on a property owner’s right to keep resident workers from
receiving on-site legal and medical assistance.62 Ultimately, this limiting
move may prove too far out of step with the Court’s ongoing property
agenda, but for the moment, it offers a potential way to cabin Cedar
Point.
Another open-door argument relates to construction on land.
Suppose a government regulation requires that a firm doing
construction work must bring with it certain items of safety equipment
as in Cedar Point, was based on the view that the CDC lacked authority to issue the moratorium,
not on takings analysis. Nonetheless, the Court observed that “preventing [landlords] from
evicting tenants who breach their leases intrudes on one of the most fundamental elements of
property ownership—the right to exclude.” Alabama Ass’n, slip op. at 7 (citing Loretto v.
Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). The Court’s invocation of Loretto, a physical takings
case, rather than Yee, which was analyzed as a use restriction, might be read as portending a shift
in the treatment of exclusion rights in landlord-tenant contexts. See Robert H. Thomas, SCOTUS
Strikes Down CDC Eviction Moratorium And Leaves Tantalizing Clues About Takings,
(Aug.
26,
2021),
INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM
https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2021/08/scotus-strikes-down-cdceviction-moratorium-and-leaves-tantalizing-clues-about-takings.html (interpreting the Court’s
failure to mention Yee as giving “a boost” to pending takings claims against eviction moratoria).
Cedar Point itself cites Yee in an ambiguous way, placing it alongside Horne in a discussion about
the use and misuse of the term “regulatory taking.” 141 S. Ct. at 2072. In context, the citation
might be read either to reaffirm that the case truly involved a use restriction and hence was
properly analyzed as a “regulatory taking,” or that it is instead an example of how “that label can
mislead.” See id.; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the term “regulatory
taking”).
61. 351 U.S. 105, 112–13 (1956). Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion in Cedar
Point but wrote separately to assert that the outcome was also supported by Babcock, “because
the California union access regulation intrudes on the growers’ property rights far more than
Babcock allows.” 141 S. Ct. at 2080 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Yet the majority’s per se rule,
which Kavanaugh claimed to adopt, is pointedly indifferent to whether one law intrudes “more”
or even “far more” on property rights than another. A different way of harmonizing the Babcock
line with Cedar Point is to understand it as defining the edges of an open-door exception to the
per se rule.
62. 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971). It is possible that this case might instead be
accommodated under state law “background principles.” See infra note 104 and accompanying
text.
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or machinery, or that certain supervisors must be present. These are
physical encroachments mandated by government, but they are part
and parcel of the owner’s decision to have the work performed. By
opening the door to a contractor, a landowner may be said to have
opened the door to the regulatory features that govern that contractor.
This approach would usefully foreclose a large set of complaints over
routine regulations. A disadvantage (for the Court) is that it moves us
conceptually very close to the labor organizer situation. If the physical
manifestations of a regulatory apparatus can follow the work crew onto
the land under an open-door theory, why do they not also follow the
farm worker?63 Difficulty in drawing such distinctions might push the
Court to accommodate construction encroachments under a different
escape clause—either as a background principle or an exaction—
though those routes have their own drawbacks.64
A similar open-door theory might also be used to accommodate
antidiscrimination law. Civil rights laws are premised on the idea that
regulated actors who make certain kinds of opportunities available
cannot make them selectively unavailable based on protected
characteristics like race, religion, or gender identity. The Cedar Point
Court embraced that logic for property that is open to the general
public, as noted above. But much of antidiscrimination law regulates
exclusion decisions on private property that is not open to the general
public. Title VII and the Fair Housing Act forbid discrimination (with
narrow exceptions) in employment and housing, respectively, reaching
even the most access-restricted residential, commercial, and industrial
land. Moreover, civil rights laws may require landowners to permit
people with disabilities to bring assistive devices or service animals
onto such private property,65 or to make reasonable modifications on
the property (such as allowing a tenant to install grab bars at her own
expense).66 Could all these laws now be viewed as per se physical

63. Another interesting example involves “parking lot laws” that require private businesses
to allow workers to bring guns onto the property and keep them stored in their cars during the
workday. See Joseph Blocher & Noah Levine, Constitutional Gun Litigation Beyond the Second
Amendment, 77 NYU ANN. SURVEY AM. L. (forthcoming 2022), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926851, at 10-12 (describing these laws and analyzing their interaction
with Cedar Point’s holding).
64. See infra Parts I.B.3 and 4.
65. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.204 (b) (providing the example of a seeing eye dog to illustrate
a “reasonable accommodation” under the Fair Housing Act).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(a) (describing “reasonable modifications” that must be
allowed under the Fair Housing Act).

FENNELL_4_9_22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

18

5/6/2022 11:11 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

takings?67
Such a conclusion seems unimaginable, but Cedar Point makes it
harder to articulate why not. After all, civil rights laws do cut into an
owner’s unfettered right to exclude, though for obviously compelling
reasons.68 The Court cannot throw all antidiscrimination law on accessrestricted private land under the per se takings bus without suffering a
devastating loss of legitimacy. But it may not be willing to grant a
blanket exception for the entire topic area either, as making the whole
of antidiscrimination law a “background principle” would do.69 A likely
middle ground would involve pairing an open-door exception to the
per se rule with a backstop of Penn Central scrutiny—a possibility I
explore in more detail below.70
There is another consideration. Most door openings of the sort
likely to be at issue here will be, at least implicitly, in exchange for
something valuable, like the right to run a business or to be a landlord.
That sets up an exchange dynamic that might call to mind the rigorous
exactions framework developed in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.71 Yet
the Court gave no sign that it was reinterpreting PruneYard as a stealth
exactions case in which the right to open one’s business to the general
public is conditioned on the duty to allow leafleting, nor did it suggest
the exactions tests of essential nexus and rough proportionality would
apply. To the extent that the Court uses this open-door theory beyond
the facts of PruneYard itself, it may be effectively endorsing an
“exactions-lite” analysis that impressionistically determines that the
owner agreed to a package deal in which the benefits justify the
burdens.72
2. Out of Bounds (Trespass)
One of the three exceptions expressly articulated in Cedar Point is
for trespasses—”isolated physical invasions”—that do not rise to the
67. See, e.g., Nikolas Bowie, Antidemocracy, 135 HARV. L. REV. 160, 196-97 (2021)
(expressing concern that Cedar Point’s holding could threaten antidiscrimination laws and other
laws protecting workers).
68. Indeed, opponents of civil rights laws made exactly such property-based arguments. See,
e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair Housing Law,
35 URB. LAW. 399, 403, 431–39 (2003) (describing use of property rights arguments in debates
over fair housing legislation).
69. See infra Part I.B.3.
70. See infra Part I.B.5.
71. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of multiple tiers of
exactions scrutiny).
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level of takings.73 These are distinguished by the Court from
“appropriations of property rights,” which are always takings if they
compromise the right to exclude (again, unless some exception
applies).74 Making the distinction was easy in Cedar Point because the
California regulation amounts to an explicit grant of access to union
representatives. Cases where the government simply acts without
writing itself a grant of access may be trickier, as the dissent suggests:
How many times can a public school bus stop for a picnic on private
land before it becomes a taking?75
Although the Court does not express it in quite these terms, the best
way of understanding this distinction is by recalling the purpose of
takings law, as articulated in Lingle v. Chevron.76 It is not to keep the
government from doing improper things; that is the work of other laws
and other parts of the Constitution. Rather, it is to keep the
government from unduly burdening certain parties when it does proper
things.77 Thus, we can distinguish lawful exercises of government power
from negligent accidents that might cause an invasion, or even
purposeful misfeasance or malfeasance that results in some physical
presence or incursion. Only when the government acts lawfully and
purposefully in undertaking or authorizing an invasion (whether
through a law or a tacit policy) is takings analysis implicated. A lawless
or accidental intrusion may be a tort, but it is not a taking.78
Understood in this way, this exception does not help the
government limit its exposure for physical incursions. The Court is not
offering governments a way of channeling their legitimate government
acts in a manner that will avoid the Takings Clause but is rather
observing that some government actions lack the legitimacy necessary
to trigger the Takings Clause. In other words, the “trespass” exception
is a way out of the per se takings trap, but it will likely land the
government (or the third party it authorized) in some other sort of
trouble for acting improperly.
73. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2078–79 (2021).
74. See id. at 2078 (emphasizing “the distinction between trespass and takings”).
75. Id. at 2088 (Breyer J., dissenting).
76. 544 U.S. 528, 537–40 (2005).
77. See id. at 543 (observing that the Takings Clause “does not bar government from
interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation ‘in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking.’”) (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis added by the Lingle Court)).
78. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2078 (“Isolated physical invasions, not undertaken
pursuant to a granted right of access, are properly assessed as individual torts rather than
appropriations of a property right.”).
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Along similar lines, this exception might be tied to the Takings
Clause’s public use limitation. The liability rule regime79 established
under the Takings Clause only applies to instances in which the
government acts for public purposes.80 When an act is accidental or
unlawful, this will not be the case. Although damages might still be
awarded, there would be no just compensation due under the Takings
Clause, because there would be no legitimate government act for such
compensation to validate.
3. The Invisible Baseline (Background Principles)
The next way of avoiding liability for a per se physical taking under
Cedar Point is to invoke “background restrictions,” or limitations on
property that inhere in title.81 The notion originated in Lucas as an
exception to its per se rule, though it applies broadly across takings
analysis. The core idea is simple: if an owner never had a particular right
in the first place, it cannot have been taken. Writing for the Lucas
majority, Scalia used common law nuisance principles (even if
embodied in statutes) as his primary examples of background
principles, although he also referenced the public necessity rule that
lets a government actor destroy property without paying compensation
when necessary to control a spreading fire.82 Later, in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, the Court made clear that a regulation does not turn into
a background principle simply because the property has changed hands
after its enactment, but did not address how or when statutes could
become background principles.83

79. I use the term “liability rule” here in the sense developed in Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). A liability rule, in Calabresi and Melamed’s schema, permits the
unilateral transfer of an entitlement upon the payment of a stipulated amount; by contrast,
property rule protection precludes transfers unless and until the owner receives a price she agrees
to accept. See id. at 1092.
80. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (following past decisions
equating “public use” with “public purpose”). The Court recently denied certiorari in a case
implicating the public use clause that could have provided an opportunity to revisit Kelo; See
Eychaner v. City of Chicago, 495 U.S. __ (2021) (denying certiorari). Justice Thomas dissented
from the denial, joined by Justice Gorsuch; Justice Kavanaugh also would have granted certiorari.
Significantly, any narrowing of “public use” should—if logic is any guide—also narrow the range
of implicit takings by removing more incursions from the realm of legitimate government actions
for which just compensation would serve as validation.
81. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
82. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16. (1992). See also
DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 118–20 (2002) (discussing this
doctrine, which is also known as “the conflagration rule”).
83. 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001).
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How do background principles work in the case of physical
incursions? Notably, the Cedar Point majority anchors its analysis in the
faux bedrock of Blackstonian “sole and despotic dominion,”
approvingly invoking a vision of property that operates “in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”84 This
might suggest that any inherent limits on exclusion would be few and
far between. Yet property scholars recognize Blackstone’s definition of
property for the hyperbole that it was; Blackstone didn’t believe it, as
his own writings make clear.85 If the Court were to consult history, it
would find not a baseline of categorical exclusion, but rather
“numerous, robust, rights to enter private property recognized at early
American law.”86 The wide gap between absolute exclusion and
historical reality, as well the many ways that longstanding principles
might be applied to meet today’s challenges, leaves background
restrictions—even if firmly rooted in the past—largely up for grabs.
In discussing background restrictions in Cedar Point, Chief Justice
Roberts gives the examples of nuisance, necessity, criminal law
enforcement, and reasonable searches.87 That suggests he is using the
idea in at least roughly the same way as Scalia did in Lucas—that is,
grounding the concept in certain longstanding common law principles
and their statutory incarnations.88 Justice Kennedy, however, had
84. Cedar Point, 141 S.Ct. at 2072 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766)).
85. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1985) (“Blackstone’s sweeping definition of the right of
property overstated the case; indeed, he devoted the succeeding 518 pages of book 2 of his
Commentaries, entitled “Of the Rights of Things,” to qualifying and specifying the exceptions to
his definition.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 361 (2001) (describing Blackstone’s famous definition of
property as “clearly a bit of hyperbole and . . . inconsistent with the balance of his treatment of
property, not to mention with the complexities of modern property law.” (footnote omitted);
Bethany Berger, Eliding Original Understanding in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, YALE J. L. &
HUM. (forthcoming 2022), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926372, draft at 9–11(detailing
rights of entry recognized by Blackstone and concluding that “Blackstonian property reflects no
absolute right to exclude”); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, Or, Blackstone’s Anxiety,
108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1986) (“If those who quote Blackstone’s definition read further, they
might come to think that Blackstone posed his definition more as a metaphor than as a literal
description—and as a slightly anxiety-provoking metaphor at that.”).
86. Berger, supra note 85, at 2.
87. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
88. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028–29 (discussing “restrictions that the background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership,” which might be
embodied in “laws that do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts”). A variety of other limits on property rights have been treated as outside of takings
scrutiny, including civil forfeitures and navigational servitudes. See, e.g., DANA & MERRILL,
supra note 82, at 110–20 (2002); Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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endorsed a more capacious vision of background principles in his
concurrence in the judgment in Lucas, which proved influential among
lower courts89—a trend that might well continue in the wake of Cedar
Point.90 Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued for a broader notion
of background principles in dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, as a way of
contending with claims that making every delay a per se taking would
be unworkable.91 Because the move that the Court made in Cedar Point
is directly analogous to the one Rehnquist supported in Tahoe-Sierra—
extending a per se rule to reach time-limited instantiations of the same
kind of government conduct—we might expect a similar understanding
of background principles to emerge. Yet the multiple escape hatches
enumerated in Cedar Point, with their varying levels of subsequent
review, make predictions difficult. Questions abound.
Could longstanding statutory regimes like antidiscrimination law
be treated as background principles? Going this route would establish
that modern statutes can count as background principles—a
proposition the Court might find difficult to cabin. A statute’s longevity
alone might not provide the Court with a stopping point that it would
find satisfactory. For example, some labor laws long predate some
antidiscrimination laws.92 Moreover, declaring the whole of civil rights
law a background principle might preclude the Court from using Penn

57, 69–70 (2012).
89. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as a Categorical Takings Defense, 29 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 321 (2005);
Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background Principles in Takings Litigation,
71 FLA. L. REV. 1165 (2019); Daniel Farber, Requiem for a Heavyweight: The Decline and Fall of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 213 (2020).
90. In Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Murr, he quoted language about background
principles and their connection to reasonable expectations from his own Lucas concurrence,
albeit in cf. cites. 137 S. Ct. at 1945–46. Some property scholars read Murr as an indication of the
Court’s movement toward Kennedy’s views on this point. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 5, at 143–
46; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 954–55. But Murr’s
framing as a case about denominators and the fact it involved what looked like a garden-variety
zoning regulation (effectively, a form of large-lot zoning) make it far from clear that the Court
really meant to embrace an inclusive understanding of background principles across contexts.
91. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency 535 U.S.
302, 351–52 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[S]hort-term delays attendant to zoning and
permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property law and part of a landowner’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations.”).
92. For instance, the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935, extending rights to
organize and protecting against interference with those rights. Although certain civil rights
protections appeared in the nineteenth century, some of the most important civil rights statutes
reaching private conduct did not appear until the 1960s, and others have been added even more
recently. For example, the Fair Housing Act only extended protections to families with children
and people with disabilities in 1988; the Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990.
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Central as a backstop in this area.93
Could health and safety inspections qualify as background
principles? To the extent regulation of certain trades through
inspections is of long standing, the background principle idea might
work. Construction-related encroachments might similarly be handled
as a background principle. Yet many modern safety and health
measures have no precise analogue in the early common law (consider,
for example, the requirement of a portable toilet on a jobsite).94 This
objection could be met by reaching for a higher level of generality and
declaring all “health and safety measures” to be background principles.
But just as Scalia worried in Lucas that any regulation could be framed
as “harm prevention” by any legislator without a “stupid staff,”95 the
Court might worry that these terms are too easily manipulable by
governmental entities.96
A more tailored approach would be to recast inspections as
administrative searches that satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The Cedar
Point majority signaled its amenability to this approach by citing
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, a case
involving administrative searches.97 Although it might seem rather
mysterious why satisfying another constitutional provision would
exempt an invasion from Takings Clause analysis, Roberts locates the
answer in the fact that “a property owner traditionally had no right to
exclude an official engaged in a reasonable search.”98 In other words, a

93. The Court could attempt to characterize only certain civil rights protections as
background principles, depending on how long a given protection has been recognized. But doing
so would make Swiss cheese out of complex modern civil rights laws and raise questions about
whether the relevant date was a statute’s enactment (or amendment) or the judicial recognition
of a specific protection. State and local civil rights protections, enacted at various times and
sometimes offering more protection than the corresponding federal statute, complicate things
further. The Court will likely find it easier to use some version of an open-door theory to move
all of antidiscrimination law into a more malleable analytic mode. I thank Molly Brady for
discussions on these points.
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.51(c) (OSHA regulation requiring toilets at construction sites).
95. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12. (1992).
96. Of course, it is not at all clear that the idea of “background principles” is any less
malleable. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054–55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing “the Court’s
reliance on common-law principles of nuisance in its quest for a value-free takings jurisprudence”
and observing that nuisance liability turns on determinations of harmfulness).
97. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
98. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 (2021). Moreover, following the
logic of Lingle, unreasonable searches (ones that violate the Fourth Amendment) should also fall
outside of Takings Clause analysis, because they represent acts that the government cannot
engage in at all, not ones that can be validated by payment of just compensation. The remedies
would be those available for violations of the Fourth Amendment, not the Takings Clause.
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background principle pulls searches out of Takings Clause analysis.
Interestingly, governmental parties may now attempt to characterize
more acts as searches, at least to the extent that establishing the
reasonableness of an administrative search proves less burdensome
than having to pay just compensation for a taking or meet heightened
exactions scrutiny.99
The “search” exception might also be used to square Cedar Point
with Wyman v. James, which upheld a requirement that welfare
recipients allow government caseworkers into their homes.100 That case
actually held that the “home visit” was not a search at all, but rather a
reasonable condition on receiving welfare (with no hint of the
heightened scrutiny the Court would later apply to conditioned
benefits in the property arena).101 However, Wyman also held in the
alternative that if it were a search, it was a reasonable one.102 It seems
unlikely the Court meant to overrule Wyman, but distinguishing the
intrusion at issue there from the one in Cedar Point requires either
finding a background principle to do the job or bringing the home visit
successfully through some other escape route.103
Because background principles are generally a matter of state
property law, common law doctrines that vary by state, such as the
public trust doctrine or specific rules of accretion and avulsion, can fit

99. Whether these requirements turn out to be less burdensome in a given instance depends
on the doctrinal intricacies surrounding administrative searches, the details of which are beyond
the scope of this essay. For a recent example of administrative search analysis involving personal
property, see Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 2021 WL 3745345 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that
suspicionless tire-chalking to enforce parking restriction was not a valid administrative search
because it did not offer the subject of the search “an opportunity to obtain precompliance review
before a neutral decisionmaker,” did not involve a “closely regulated industry” and did not serve
any special law enforcement needs) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420, 424
(2015)).
100. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Barbara James, the plaintiff in Wyman, objected on multiple
constitutional grounds, invoking the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as raising statutory claims. See id. at 314. The Court’s analysis
focused on the Fourth Amendment question.
101. Id. at 317–18.
102. Id. at 318–25.
103. Exactions analysis is the most likely candidate, but would involve applying significantly
more scrutiny than the Court applied in the original case. See infra Part I.B.4. Another possibility
would be some version of the open-door theory based on the recipient’s supposed consent. See
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317–18 (“If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The
aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be.”). Yet this view would be strikingly
inconsistent with the Court’s exactions jurisprudence, in which consent is irrelevant if the choice
is deemed to be unduly coercive, and one need not accept the bargain in order to be able to
challenge it as unconstitutional. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,
2594–96 (2013).
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in here as well. Similarly, some state courts might deem certain
protections for workers or tenants to be inherent limits on title that
cabin the ability of an employer or landlord to exclude.104 But there is
an important caveat: a plurality of the Court in Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection
stood ready to invalidate as a “judicial taking” any state court decision
that diverged too sharply from past precedent.105 The baseline, the
plurality insisted, must remain fixed—though no one knows for certain
how long of a history is sufficient to establish a background principle.106
One final point is worth emphasizing: background principles are
strong medicine. Once something is designated as a background
principle, it is immunized against all implicit takings claims—not just
the per se claims associated with physical access.107 This has to be the
case, because to call something an inherent limit on title is to say that it
is not part of the owner’s property rights package at all. Thus, if
“preserving health and safety” is broadly declared a background
principle in order to save inspections, then use restrictions carried out
for health and safety purposes would never be takings either, even if
they leave land valueless forever—an unlikely conclusion for the
current Court to endorse. Yet narrowing the scope of the background
principle so that it only reaches health and safety inspections would
curiously invert the heightened protection against physical invasions
that Cedar Point sought to achieve.
There is a notable tension here: applying a broad per se rule
generates a great deal of pressure for categorical exceptions to avoid a
flood of litigation. Yet those same exceptions may end up leaving more
exposure for property owners than a world in which a looser test
applies to all enactments108—unless the exceptions get routed
104. This is one way of understanding the limits that the New Jersey Supreme Court placed
on the ability of an employer to exclude visitors attending to the medical and legal needs of
workers residing on site. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Title to real property
cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the
premises.”). I thank John Infranca for discussions on this point.
105. 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
106. In Stop the Beach, the relevant precedent dated back to the 1920s. Martin v. Busch, 112
So. 274 (Fla. 1927). For further data points on this question, see Blumm & Wolfard, supra note
89, at 1182.
107. See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 327 (“The background principles inquiry
authorized by Lucas is an absolute defense to any takings claim.”).
108. See generally id. (observing that while Lucas’s per se takings rule is rarely applied, its
“background principles” exception has spawned many categorical defenses to takings claims that
strengthen the government’s position); Farber, supra note 8 (discussing the likelihood that
landowners will lose more than they gain from Cedar Point as a result of this dynamic).
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somewhere else for another layer of scrutiny. For this reason, the opendoor theory (outlined above) or exactions analysis (to be taken up
next) may be preferred by the Court over an approach that toggles
directly between a per se taking and the per se exception of background
principles. For a Court that wants to extend blanket protection against
physical incursions to property owners while maintaining fine-grained
control over the content of the exceptions, the preferred egress from
the per se rule would lead not to a no-liability conclusion, but rather to
another test.109
4. The Constricting Hoops (Exactions)
Cedar Point also presented exactions—bargains with the
government—as a potential way to transform what would otherwise be
a per se taking into a nontaking.110 Although the majority made this
sound like a simple escape route, it may turn out to be a false door or
even a trap for the government. The Court assumed that typical
inspections could easily meet the twin requirements of essential nexus
and rough proportionality laid out in Nollan and Dolan, respectively.111
But the application of exactions analysis to inspections is not as
straightforward as the Court suggests.
It is worth initially noting the oddness of casting exactions in the
redemptive role contemplated by the Court. Because exactions
scrutiny is so much more exacting than the analysis that generally
applies to governmental actions, governments have generally tried to
avoid having regulatory schemes characterized as exactions. But Cedar
Point flips the script by making every minor grant of access a per se
taking (unless some exception applies). As one of the Court’s
enumerated exceptions, exactions analysis now appears in the analysis
not as a threat to government action but as a potential means of

109. Might background principles themselves recursively build in further takings tests rather
than merely create a safe harbor from takings analysis? Clearly, background principles can embed
complex doctrinal standards on the front end (such as whether something counts as a nuisance)
and can also dictate that a government action exempted from takings analysis be analyzed under
a different constitutional standard, such as the Fourth Amendment. Yet to use the idea of
background principles to move among takings tests would be a different, and more circular,
enterprise. See infra notes 128–132 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the
Court means to tier its exactions analysis in a similar manner, perhaps based on the harmfulness
of a given property use).
110. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 (2021).
111. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text (describing these requirements).
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dodging liability for a taking.
Notably, the Court has never explicitly decided whether exactions
scrutiny even applies to “legislative” requirements that operate across
the board, as opposed to individualized administrative or adjudicative
bargains of the sort at issue in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.112 Yet Cedar
Point indicates that one way to keep access regulations (which are set
out in generally applicable terms) from counting as per se takings is to
analyze them as part of an exchange. This tacitly assumes the exactions
framework applies in this setting, at least in a redemptive role. And by
invoking the tests in Nollan and Dolan, the Cedar Point majority
suggested that it had in mind full-strength exactions scrutiny, not the
sort of rational basis review that would normally apply to routine
governmental acts.113 As I will discuss below, what might look like a
lifeline thrown out to the government in the per se realm might turn
out to be a snare in the use restriction realm, if it means a broad
extension of exactions scrutiny to legislative enactments.114
Is the Court right that inspections and the like will easily pass
heightened exactions scrutiny? Let’s examine the moving parts. As an
application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, an exaction always
has two components: a governmental benefit that could be legally
granted or withheld, and a requested concession—some property
interest of the individual that the government would ordinarily have to
pay just compensation to obtain.115 The first term, the discretionary
government benefit, might be a building permit or a license to operate
a particular kind of business. Cedar Point fills in the second term by
specifying that any grant of access, no matter how limited (unless
otherwise excepted) is a per se taking for which just compensation
112. See, e.g., California Bldg. Indust. Ass’n v. San Jose, 577 U.S. 1179 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (noting the “important and unsettled issue” of whether the
exactions framework applies to legislative enactments, on which lower courts have been divided).
See also Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 5, at 295–97, 340–46 (discussing this undecided question).
113. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079. The fact that the Court follows its articulation of the
Nollan/Dolan test with an invocation of a more lenient test, see id. (citing Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984)), raises some doubt on this point, however. See infra notes 128–
132 and accompanying text. Another interesting question is whether the nexus and
proportionality tests might be applied differently in a legislative context, based on the overall
operation of a given provision rather than with respect to each individual instance. I thank Aziz
Huq for discussions on this point.
114. See infra Part I.C.5.
115. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (discussing constitutional limits on
requiring a party to give up the right to just compensation “in exchange for a discretionary
benefit”).
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would ordinarily be required.116 Nollan and Dolan test the relationship
between these components.117
For essential nexus to exist, the reason for not granting the license
must be the same reason that the government is asking for the
concession.118 Consider factory safety inspections. The reason the
government might withhold a license to operate a factory is a fear that
it will be operated unsafely. This is the same reason that the
government would want to have inspections (assuming the inspections
reasonably detect, deter, and correct unsafe conditions). Thus,
essential nexus is satisfied.Rough proportionality is another matter.
Here, it is not enough that a logical connection exists between the
reason the government would have for withholding a license and the
concession that it is requesting. Instead, the government must show
that the extent of the concession is at least roughly equivalent to the
harms that would otherwise ensue if the government were to simply
grant the license.119 How does this work? We might say that the safety
inspection must do only (roughly) what is necessary to meet the risk of
unsafe conditions, but how much inspection access is too much?
One approach would be to start by calculating the costs of unsafe
conditions. But how can we know how unsafe the factory would be,
absent inspections? Even if we could gather this data, how do we assess
the proportionality of the required inspections? Is the requirement that
they be no more frequent than necessary to deter? Is the analysis a sort
of least intrusive means test that pushes governments to inspect less
frequently yet fine more heavily in order to achieve the maximum
degree of deterrence at lowest “invasion cost”?120 Or perhaps
proportionality simply requires comparing the safety benefits of an
inspection with the magnitude of the burden imposed on the
landowner during the time it takes to do the inspection.121
Regardless of the exact formulation, making the necessary showing
116. Cedar Point, 141 S.Ct. at 2072–74.
117. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
118. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (setting out the
“essential nexus” requirement).
119. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (describing the “rough proportionality” standard).
120. Cf. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
176–79 (1968) (observing that the expected utility of crime is influenced by both the probability
and the severity of punishment).
121. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 293 n.28 (observing that Dolan “left ambiguous
whether it is the harm eliminated by the exaction that must be proportional to the harm the
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is likely to be nontrivial. Notably, the government must affirmatively
establish nexus and proportionality, in an inversion of the usual way
that burdens are allocated in evaluating government action.122 This
requirement would likely raise the costs of inspections, reducing resort
to them as a regulatory strategy. The same might be said of exactions
as a response to construction-related encroachments. Although there
will always be a building permit in the story that could serve as the hook
for requiring a concession, applying essential nexus and rough
proportionality to justify every physically mandated facet of every
construction project could quickly become cumbersome.
There is, of course, no reason to think that the Court is opposed to
health inspections or construction safety.123 Any erosion in these
domains would just be collateral damage in the Court’s quest to stamp
out unwanted impositions on property owners. Routing more
regulations through exactions analysis allows the Court to pick and
choose which kinds of impositions on property it will or will not
tolerate—but not costlessly. It can try to do the same thing by
selectively recognizing background principles, though not without
risking unintended exposure for property owners as noted above.
Alternatively, the Court could expand on the open-door theory above.
Doing so is conceptually treacherous (why has the door not also been
opened to labor?) but it does allow a soft landing in Penn Central-land.
Another point, easy to miss in the majority opinion, may also
dramatically limit the reach of the exaction exception. The Court
maintained that exactions analysis could not save the access
requirement at issue in Cedar Point itself, because “the access
regulation is not germane to any benefit provided to agricultural
employers or any risk posed to the public.”124 Of course, California’s
law could be rewritten conditionally to say that in exchange for the
benefit of operating an agricultural facility the growers must allow
access to union organizers. But the Court cuts off this possibility. The

development causes or whether it is the burden of the exaction (to the landowner) that must be
proportional to those harms.”). Focusing on harm suffered by the landowner, depending on how
it is measured, might more readily satisfy proportionality—indeed, perhaps too readily for the
Court’s liking.
122. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
123. There is also no reason to think that most commercial landowners are opposed to
inspections, which may not only inspire consumer confidence but also raise the costs of entry by
competitors.
124. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2080 (2021).

FENNELL_4_9_22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

30

5/6/2022 11:11 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

“not germane to” language might suggest the Court is (only)
summarily deciding in advance that no such access law could ever meet
the essential nexus requirement.125 Yet the Court goes further, citing
Horne v. Department of Agriculture for the proposition that “‘basic and
familiar uses of property’ are not a special benefit that ‘the
Government may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of
constitutional protections.’”126 That language suggests we would never
even reach exactions analysis, because there could be no (real) benefit
in the picture that might validate what would otherwise be a per se
taking.
Complicating that interpretation, however, is the fact that Horne
referenced similar “no benefit” language in Nollan, the case that
established the first prong of the Court’s rigorous exactions test.127 In
Nollan, the Court distinguished Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, where it had
rejected a claim that requiring data from a pesticide producer
amounted to an unconstitutional condition, explaining that “as long as
Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are
submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate
Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in
exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be
called a taking.”128 This is a rational-basis-style inquiry that is nothing
like the exactions test the Court developed in Nollan and Dolan. Nollan
rejected the Monsanto approach on the grounds that the right to build
on one’s land “cannot remotely be described as a ‘governmental
benefit.’”129 This is a baffling statement, given that the existence of a
discretionary government benefit is an essential ingredient of any
exaction; it is what the government offers in exchange for a property
concession.130 Apparently, the permit in Nollan was enough of a benefit
to qualify for exactions analysis, but not enough of a benefit to get the
Monsanto treatment.
To recap: the Cedar Point Court suggests that inspections can easily
pass Nollan and Dolan (a rigorous test), then cites Monsanto for good
125. Id. at 2080; see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987).
126. See id. (quoting Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U.S. 351, 366 (2015)).
127. Horne, 576 U.S. at 366 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2). I thank Chris Elmendorf for
discussions on this point.
128. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984).
129. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
130. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (explaining that under Nollan, a
landowner cannot be required to cede property without just compensation “in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no
relationship to the property”).
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measure (which applies a much more lenient test), then asserts that the
union access requirement could never pass muster because it does not
involve a government benefit that can be “h[e]ld hostage,” using
language from Horne (which found a taking without reaching exactions
analysis at all), which referenced similar language in Nollan, that in
turn was used to distinguish Monsanto.131 What are we to make of this
pattern of clues?
We know this much: the Court wants a test that health and safety
inspections will easily clear and that union access requirements cannot
pass under any circumstances. Can it reliably get there with a single
exactions test, or does the Court mean to ease the analytic pressure by
declaring some kinds of exchanges unworthy of exactions analysis at
all? Alternatively, or in addition, does it mean to say that certain kinds
of exchanges get more lenient Monsanto treatment, not full-strength
Nollan/Dolan treatment?132
Sitting squarely in the middle of this muddle is the elephant in the
room: zoning. Permission to build on one’s own land was deemed to
not constitute a government benefit in Nollan, but the fact remains that
such permission is tightly controlled through zoning and permitting
processes that the Court surely does not mean to cast doubt upon. If a
restriction is valid, how can lifting it not count as a benefit? If running
an agricultural enterprise is the kind of “basic and familiar use” that
cannot be held hostage, how can it be said that putting a duplex or even
an apartment building on one’s own plot of land is somehow less basic
or less familiar? Yet presumably the Court wants to allow zoning
prohibitions that rule out these and many other uses, even if it also
wants to strictly control bargains to lift them.133 If the idea is to stamp
out restrictions imposed simply for leverage, then making them
inalienable in this way offers a roundabout way to undercut that
incentive.134
131. See supra notes 110–130 and accompanying text.
132. Chris Elmendorf has suggested the Court may have had something like this in mind,
invoking Robert Ellickson’s distinction between “normal” and “subnormal” uses to determine
the kind of exactions scrutiny to be applied. See Chris Elmendorf (@CSElmendorf), TWITTER,
(June 29, 2021, 2:46 p.m.), https://twitter.com/CSElmendorf/status/1409986672784076800?s=20
(citing Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977)).
133. This points up an incongruity that has existed in exactions analysis since its inception:
the fact that land use restrictions are subjected to a much more lenient test than the bargains to
lift them. See e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steal: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
134. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1455 (2009)
(suggesting that alienability limits might be aimed at reducing strategic land use enactments by
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If the “no benefit” language in Cedar Point means that some uses
cannot be conditioned on government access at all, even if the access
condition satisfies nexus and proportionality, this represents an
important limitation. In such cases, the exactions route would be a false
door that cannot, in fact, be opened. On this interpretation, the Court
would be dramatically restricting the government’s ability to engage in
bargains at exactly the same moment and with exactly the same pen
stroke as it has suddenly and dramatically increased the need for
governments to resort to such bargains in order to govern. Before
Cedar Point, governments did not need to bargain for every entry
necessary to carry out a regulatory program. The case summarily
eliminates that power, throws out exactions as a lifeline, but then
(perhaps) retracts it if the land is being used in a “basic and familiar”
way.
5. The Mystery Flume (Penn Central and Physical Takings)
We have already seen that some of the escape hatches from per se
takings in the physical realm lead not to a conclusion of no liability but
rather to some further analytic waystation. This is most evident in the
case of exactions, where escaping the per se frying pan means landing
in the fire of heightened scrutiny. Similarly, isolated trespasses by the
government that don’t qualify for takings analysis can still give rise to
liability as torts or otherwise.135 Background principles, however, seem
to flip a binary on/off switch that toggles between a per se taking and
no taking at all, even though there might well be differing degrees of
“backgroundedness”—how firmly embedded a particular principle is
in background understandings of limits on property, or how much
consensus surrounds that legal conclusion. To declare something a
background limitation on title is to cede all control over it under the
Takings Clause, which the Court may not want to do broadly. Yet the
very breadth of Cedar Point will demand broad exceptions, if courts do
not wish to be overrun with takings cases over trivial instances of
governmental access.
The open-door theory,136 although not well developed in Cedar
Point, raises another possibility: diverting access requirements that
follow from voluntarily assumed limits on exclusion into a Penn Central
analysis. To be sure, the notion of a direct flume chute from the per se
local governments).
135. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 .
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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takings realm to Penn Central operates in significant tension with
Cedar Point’s reinforcement of the wall between use restrictions and
physical takings. Indeed, the Court explicitly banished the Penn
Central test from the physical realm in Cedar Point: “Whenever a
regulation results in a physical appropriation of property, a per se
taking has occurred, and Penn Central has no place.”137 This is an odd
statement, given that Penn Central itself illustrates its third factor, the
character of the government action, by reference to whether it is
physical in nature.138 But perhaps the Court means to place great
weight on the word “appropriation” in that sentence, treating it as a
legal conclusion that does not really reach all government actions that
involve grants of physical access.
Because alleged implicit takings that don’t qualify for per se
treatment have traditionally wound up in a Penn Central analysis, it
seems likely that they will continue to do so, even if they are, or initially
seem, physical in character.139 Notably, PruneYard was analyzed under
Penn Central.140 Because Roberts was focused on dismissing this
inconvenient precedent as irrelevant to the Cedar Point outcome, he
did not say what happens in the open-to-the-public cases of the future.
But it seems unimaginable that they would get less scrutiny than
before. If variations on this open-door argument are used to save laws
from per se takings status, as discussed above, it is a sure bet that the
Court will still wish for them to receive some takings scrutiny (such as
not allowing eviction moratoria to go on too long, or not allowing rent
control laws to protect too broadly).
Assuming Penn Central analysis remains a backstop for some
physical incursions that escape the per se grip of Cedar Point, this
would be a remaining point of contact between the analytic structure
for use restrictions (which still uses Penn Central as the default) and
that for physical takings (which are now categorically per se takings,
unless an exception applies). How should we interpret that
connection? There are at least two possibilities.
One is that the physical takings realm remains outfitted with a
vestigial Penn Central scrutiny area for addressing open-door cases.
137. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021).
138. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
139. This assumes that they do not qualify for one of the Court’s other exceptions.
140. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in PruneYard, articulated the Penn Central
factors (albeit without identifying them as such) in working through the takings analysis.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980). He also cited Penn Central in an
earlier footnote. Id. at n.7.
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This is likely to feel analytically unsatisfying for a Court that is
determined to grant absolute priority to the owner’s right to exclude.
The other option is to deny that any taking that does not qualify for the
per se rule could ever be a physical taking at all—an interpretation that
seems more consistent with the Court’s statements in Cedar Point.
Thus, the open-door theory might be interpreted as a judgment that the
encroachment is not really physical after all (despite having a physical
manifestation), but rather is only, at base, a restriction on use. In this
scenario, some laws that start off in the physical takings realm would
be reclassified as they ride the flume into the use restriction area, where
they could safely receive Penn Central treatment.
This latter alternative would be consistent with the Court’s
reasoning in Yee, which read limits on the power over one’s invited
tenants as a regulatory rather than physical matter.141 It could also offer
a way to explain away PruneYard, by focusing on the fact that the
person would have been welcome as a member of the public but for
their behavior (leafleting, rather than shopping), so the state
constitutional provision only expanded what behaviors were permitted.
But this theory quickly runs into serious problems.
For starters, why can’t the shopping mall say that it means to let in
“shoppers” but not “leafleters” in the same way that an employer might
wish to allow in “employees” but not “former employees” even though
the same human being might occupy both roles over the course of
time? Antidiscrimination laws are even harder to harmonize with this
theory because the owner may really mean to exclude particular people
(employees or tenants, say) because of their protected characteristics.142
Yee spoke to this issue in countering claims that the rent control law
deprived the park owners of the chance to choose new incoming
tenants: “Because they voluntarily open their property to occupation
by others, petitioners cannot assert a per se right to compensation
based on their inability to exclude particular individuals.”143 That
141. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
142. One might argue that the owner had actually invited in “any person with x
qualifications,” and then characterize as regulatory the limits on decisionmaking that follow—but
there is a somewhat circular nature to this argument that depends on accepting the law’s judgment
about what kinds of invitations can and can’t be issued to prospective tenants and employees.
These normative precepts could, of course, be treated as background principles, which would pull
the area out of takings law altogether—a normatively desirable result, but one that it is unclear
the Court will embrace.
143. Yee, 503 U.S. at 530–31; see also CDK Global v. Brnovich, 16 F.4th 1266, 1282 (9th Cir.
2021) (citing Yee in rejecting a takings challenge to a law that prevented database providers who
licensed their databases to dealers from excluding third parties from that data).
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analysis suggests that opening one’s door to “others” is enough to make
any subsequent restriction on exclusion regulatory rather than physical
in nature, a conclusion at odds with Cedar Point’s holding.
There is a further problem in distinguishing the Cedar Point
situation from the one in Pruneyard. It is unclear how requiring an
owner to suffer leafleting represents a restriction on the owner’s use of
her own property, which is seemingly necessary to bring the situation
under the Court’s looser “use restriction” standard.144 The only “use”
of the owner that is being legally constrained is the owner’s exercise of
a right to exclude (here, by ejection). One could say the same of an
access requirement that does not allow the owner to exclude a
government agent or third party in the first instance—that it is only
forbidding the “use” of excluding the person. Is it really any less of an
imposition on the right to exclude to say that a person engaging in
unwanted behaviors on one’s property cannot be asked to leave?145 In
both cases, the legal requirement to allow the person to enter or remain
on the land may, as a practical matter, limit what the owner can do on
her own land, whether through disruption or by taking up space needed
for some other use. But, again, that does not serve to distinguish
between the cases.
More foundationally, exclusion is of little value to an owner if it is
not paired with the right to selectively include and to make use of the
property in the ways the owner wishes (and not in other ways).146 Most
property theorists who center their analysis on exclusion see it as a
means to an end—being able to use your property as you wish.147 And
144. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2071 (“When the government, rather than appropriating
private property for itself or a third party, instead imposes regulations that restrict an owner’s
ability to use his own property, a different standard applies.”).
145. There is an odd formalism in making so much turn on the initial invitation to enter,
regardless of what happens thereafter, as if takings law has adopted the terms of engagement
associated with vampires. See Gwen Seabourne, Vampire Property Law: Fiend Simple Absolute
SISTER
(Nov.
3,
2021),
in
Possession?
BRACHTON’S
https://vifgage.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/2022/01/21/vampire-property-law-fiend-simple-absolute-inpossession/ (discussing the rule that vampires may never enter a home unless they are invited in,
but may exploit an unsuspecting victim’s misperceptions about their identity and purpose to gain
admittance).
146. Thomas Merrill makes these points in one of the most exclusion-centric academic pieces
of the past half-century, which is cited approvingly by the majority in Cedar Point. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 740 (1998) (“As Blackacre’s
gatekeeper, A [the owner] has the power to determine who has access to Blackacre and on what
terms.”) (emphasis added; footnote omitted); id. at 740–45 (arguing that all of the core rights in
property, including the right to use, can be derived from the right to exclude).
147. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (presenting his
“exclusion thesis,” which maintains that “the right to property is a right to exclude others from
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even when exclusion is sought for reasons other than making use of the
property oneself—James Stern gives the example of an owner who
does not want to allow neo-Nazis to hold a rally on his property148—it
is the owner’s ability to control or veto uses on the land that remains
paramount.149 Presumably the owner’s exclusion rights would be no less
compromised if the neo-Nazis initially posed as birdwatchers to gain
entry by invitation and the owner was then forbidden to expel them
once they began waving banners and shouting slogans.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court’s fetishizing
treatment of exclusion rights should extend to use rights as well—none
of these rights should be treated as absolute, nor could they be (as the
Court’s various exceptions amply illustrate). Rather, I mean only to
emphasize the instability of fixating on the circumstances of an initial
boundary crossing, if the concern animating implicit takings is
supposed to be about compensating excessive burdens on owners.150
This is all the more true when we recognize that modern conditions
make physical exclusion less and less relevant to the ability of owners
to derive value from their resources.151
Yet, if the Court truly wishes to elevate exclusion over all other
interests, the sorts of recharacterizations necessary to turn PruneYard
into a use restriction case would expose, and contribute to, weaknesses
in the wall separating the physical and regulatory realms. Nearly every
regulatory scheme has some physical manifestations, even if it is only
to ensure that the regulations have been followed. And nearly any

things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things”) (emphasis omitted); Henry
E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“[E]xclusion is a means to an end and not an end in
itself, and is far from absolute even as a means. No one except a fetishist would believe that
exclusion is a positive good, but the right to exclude indirectly serves a wide—and, crucially, only
vaguely specified—set of interests.”) (footnote omitted). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 25 (2014) (“Exclusion
is not a goal or valuable end of the institution of property. It is a critical feature that produces a
variety of ends, many good, some bad.”).
148. James Y. Stern, What Is the Right to Exclude and Why Does It Matter?, in PROPERTY
THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 38, 66-67 (James Penner & Michael Otsuka
eds., 2018).
149. See id. at 39 (“[T]he right to exclude can be redescribed as the right to prohibit one or
more persons from using a particular resource, either at all or in some category of ways.”).
150. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (describing takings jurisprudence as
burden-focused); see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the
Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”).
151. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property Beyond Exclusion, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV.
521 (2019) (questioning the primacy of exclusion as the hallmark of property rights).
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physical manifestation of a regulatory system can be recharacterized as
essentially restrictive in nature. The expansion of the per se rule on the
physical side of the wall will heighten the incentive for creative
recharacterizations. If the Court is committed to maintaining a wall
between the sectors, keeping Penn Central as a safety valve on the
physical side could help reduce the pressure on the wall itself.
C. Use Restrictions
The main action in Cedar Point takes place in the newly renovated
physical takings room. On its face, nothing in the opinion addresses
government actions that do not result in physical boundary crossings,
but that instead restrict or otherwise negatively affect how the
landowner can use or benefit from her land. But let’s take a look
around the use restriction sector of the Court’s escape room anyway.
As all home renovators know, upgrading one part of the house often
leads to dissatisfaction with other parts. The same principle applies, one
might suppose, to designers of escape rooms. So our tour will include
discussion of some likely upgrades and rearrangements. We will also
note some points of contact between the sectors, including the
possibility, raised above, that Penn Central analysis might feature in
both.
1. Out of Bounds, Again (Illegitimate Government Actions)
Recall the trespass/takings distinction developed back in the
physical takings realm, one of several exceptions enumerated in Cedar
Point. I suggested that this exception is best understood as a kind of
threshold inquiry into whether we are dealing with the sort of
purposeful and legitimate governmental action that can be validated
by compensation. The same dichotomy applies here in the use
restriction sector. Once we reach the point of asking whether
something is a taking, we have already decided (at least provisionally)
that it is not a violation of some other binding law or constitutional
provision.152
This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate government
action matters, because a wholly permissible remedy for a taking is just
compensation: the governmental action can continue unabated as long
as the owner gets paid. On the other hand, if the government act runs
152. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (“[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that
the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”).
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afoul of the Constitution in other ways, or is ultra vires under some
other binding law, the government may simply be compelled to stop
doing it.153 We can again invoke the public use limitation in the Takings
Clause to flesh out this point. If what the government is doing does not
align with a public purpose, it cannot possibly be validated through the
payment of just compensation, and thus cannot amount to a takings
issue.
To be clear, this way of exiting the implicit takings escape room
offers no respite for the government—it is a way out of the analytic
structure but not a way to save the law or act in question, which is, by
hypothesis, invalid.
2. The “Too Far” Treadmill
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the putative origination point of
regulatory takings, Justice Holmes set out the oft-repeated maxim that
“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”154 All of the implicit takings
tests devised between then and now are (at least in theory) meant to
determine how far is too far, or, put another way, when a governmental
action amounts to the functional equivalent of eminent domain.155
Although the distance metaphor invokes a scalar concept, the takings
inquiry asks a binary question.156 The Court has tried to draw the “too
far” line through a mix of per se and balancing tests, as noted above.
The way in which the Court has defined “too far,” however, has hardly
managed to isolate for compensation the most severe impositions on
property owners—as we can easily see by glancing back into the
physical takings sector and noting the minor, temporary incursions that
now count as per se takings.
At the moment, a finding of a taking seems less likely in the use
restriction realm the “less far” it goes in burdening the landowner.
Significantly, however, Cedar Point justifies its across-the-board per se
rule in the physical realm by emphasizing that takings liability is
already scaled to reflect the severity of the violation of property rights

153. See id. at 543 (“No amount of compensation can authorize [an impermissible] action”).
154. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
155. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
156. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967) (observing that,
notwithstanding Holmes’s language, “the test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it
does not ask ‘how much,’ but rather (like the physical-occupation test) it asks ‘whether or not’”).
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through the calculation of just compensation.157 The idea that a
burden’s severity goes only to compensation is currently confined to
Cedar Point’s discussion of physical takings, but it is anyone’s guess
how long this notion will remain limited to that context. An extension
of Lucas’s per se rule, following the logic of Cedar Point, might be
justified in just this manner.158 So while going “less far” currently
reduces the risk of takings liability for a use restriction, this result is
contingent not only on the precise interplay of the Penn Central factors
but also on the stability of the precedents that currently apply Penn
Central reasoning to most use restrictions.
3. Avoiding the Void (Total Takings)
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court articulated a
per se rule: a government action that eliminates all economically
beneficial use of land will be a taking unless the restrictions in question
were already part of background principles of law.159 In addition to
raising knotty questions about the content of background principles,160
Lucas’s new per se rule introduced the “denominator problem”: how
to define the “all” when assessing whether all economically viable use
has been eliminated. Although the problem has not been fully
resolved, the Court has resisted defining the denominator by reference
to the regulation itself—for instance, interpreting a ban on llamas as a
“total taking” of an owner’s llama-raising rights. That would be an
illegitimate form of “conceptual severance,” a term coined by
Margaret Jane Radin to express the Court’s unwillingness to divide up
a property holding into its regulated subparts.161
The Court’s campaign against conceptual severance reached an
apex in Tahoe-Sierra, which involved a moratorium on building near
Lake Tahoe that had the effect of removing all economically viable use
from the affected properties for a period of years.162 The Court
157. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2074 (2021) (“The duration of an
appropriation—just like the size of an appropriation—bears only on the amount of
compensation.”) (citation omitted).
158. See discussion infra Part I.C.4.
159. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992).
160. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
161. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674–79 (1998).
162. The exact time frame was disputed. The majority focused on a 32-month period, TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency 535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002), while
the dissent characterized the development ban as lasting “almost six years,” id. at 346–47
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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declined to treat the total taking of a time slice as a Lucas taking,
holding instead that this sort of temporary regulation was better
handled under the Court’s general-purpose approach for regulatory
takings, the multi-factor Penn Central test.163 The Court did not
overrule Tahoe-Sierra in Cedar Point when it effaced the distinction
between temporary and permanent physical invasions. Indeed,
Roberts went out of his way to continually cite the case (eight times!)
for a variety of basic takings propositions. Yet never at any point did
the majority opinion mention Tahoe-Sierra’s core holding about time
slices, much less suggest that this holding had any relevance to Cedar
Point.
Although Roberts’s past connection with Tahoe-Sierra may have
played a role (he successfully represented the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency before the Court), his repeated citations to the case may have
been designed to emphasize that the case remained good law and that
the Court was not overruling it—at least not yet. In other words, what
happens in the physical takings sector stays in the physical takings
sector. Nonetheless, the strict compartmentalization that allows Cedar
Point to coexist with Tahoe Sierra may prove difficult to sustain. Indeed,
it’s easy to lose our footing when looking at the cases side by side.
4. The Uneven Floor (Can Tahoe-Sierra Survive?)
As we continue our tour of the use restriction realm, we can’t help
noticing that the floor is tilting rather alarmingly. Cedar Point
introduced a sharp asymmetry between temporary physical
occupations and temporary deprivations of all economically beneficial
use. The permanent versions of these government acts had long been
subject to per se rules under Loretto and Lucas, respectively.
Consistent with its elevation of the right to exclude to the premier
position in the hierarchy of property sticks, however, the Court now
views even the most trivial temporal shards of physical access as per se
takings—again, subject to the various exceptions noted already. But
making land totally unusable for several years still gets Penn Central
treatment under Tahoe Sierra. In short, the Court scaled one rule but
left the other unscaled.
We can’t expect this asymmetry to last long, especially when
governments can often employ use restrictions as substitutes for access163. Id. at 330–42. The Court did not evaluate the moratorium under Penn Central because
the landowners failed to appeal the decision below on that ground. Id. at 317–18.
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based regulations. Any asymmetry can be resolved in two ways—by
making the taller thing shorter or the shorter thing taller. Accordingly,
one possibility would be to tone down Cedar Point so that its holding
looks more like Tahoe-Sierra, perhaps by reading it as only applying to
access restrictions that lack a defined end date. But nothing in the
opinion supports this interpretation, and there is no reason to predict
that this gloss will be added later. This limiting principle would only
encourage governments to always add an end date (and then change
it), which is just the sort of gamesmanship the Court has been trying to
preclude in its takings jurisprudence. The other possibility seems far
more likely: that at the next available opportunity, the Court will
overrule Tahoe-Sierra to bring it into line with Cedar Point.
All of the conceptual infrastructure for extending Lucas’s per se
rule is already in place, just waiting to be deployed. The idea that just
compensation awards can scale to match the temporal extent of the
imposition, developed in Cedar Point, could be readily transplanted to
the total takings arena. And just as Cedar Point contained assurances
that reaching temporary encroachments would not spell disaster, due
to the availability of various exceptions, so too could the same
exceptions be invoked in a future case overruling Tahoe-Sierra. First,
short-term inability to use one’s land might occur through something
better characterized as a tort than a governmental action—for example,
an improperly blocked road or a power outage—and this would not be
a taking. Second, background principles would be brought in to save
all kinds of short-term incursions on use (an idea already developed in
Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra).164 Finally, exactions could be used
to assess and potentially bless any other short-term use prohibitions,
again expanding the footprint of exactions analysis and the heightened
scrutiny it brings.
These solutions come with the problems already enumerated, and
it is possible that once courts have a chance to gain some experience
with Cedar Point’s framework, the idea of expanding it into the use
restriction realm will seem less appealing. But attacking the asymmetry
through expansion seems quite likely. Significant, too, is the fact that
this move would not threaten traditional forms of zoning, if the Court
adopted Rehnquist’s explicitly zoning-friendly reading of background
principles in the Tahoe-Sierra dissent.165
164. See id. at 351–52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. See id. (citing the long history of zoning to support the claim that its usual delays cannot
count as takings). Indeed, Rehnquist’s Tahoe-Sierra dissent might be read to suggest that zoning
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5. The Constricting Hoops, Again (Exactions)
Recall that exactions analysis was one of the escape hatches
enumerated in Cedar Point for keeping routine physical impositions
from amounting to takings.166 The Court’s suggestion that governments
employ the rigorous exactions framework to shield health and safety
inspections from its per se rule for physical incursions carries large,
unacknowledged implications for exactions analysis on the use
restriction side of the divide. In offering up the exactions alternative,
the Cedar Point majority was, perhaps unwittingly, assuming the
answer to a still-unsettled question about the scope of exactions
scrutiny: whether it applies to legislative enactments that set out
conditions for governmental permits in a formulaic, standardized
manner.167 Notably, health and safety inspections are typically
authorized in just this format, through uniformly applied rules that
appear in statutes or regulations, rather than through individualized
bargains. This question of scope, which the Court skated past without
comment in Cedar Point, turns out to be highly consequential for land
use restrictions. To see why, consider where exactions analysis stood,
pre-Cedar Point.
Nollan and Dolan, the cases setting out the two prongs of Court’s
exactions test, both involved physical appropriations of interests in
land; both also involved “adjudicative” or ad hoc bargains with
individual landowners, not broad-brush legislative enactments.168
Subsequently, Koontz expanded the scope of exactions scrutiny by
declaring that governmental land use bargains that involve monetary
payments fall within the exactions domain.169 This holding had the
effect of making any land use regulation suspect as an exaction if it
itself is a background principle. See id. at 352 (“Zoning regulations existed as far back as colonial
Boston . . . and New York City enacted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916 . . . .”)
(citations omitted). Cedar Point does suggest that zoning remains subject to takings analysis of
the sort usually conducted under Penn Central. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2071–72 (listing
“zoning ordinances” as one of the “varied” use restrictions to which the “framework” developed
in Mahon, and now usually addressed under Penn Central, applies). Whether longstanding forms
of zoning are treated as background principles or given the green light through a Penn Central
analysis, the result will be the same. This does not mean that everything framed as “zoning” will
receive such deferential treatment; we might expect a different approach to inclusionary zoning
measures, for example, whether based on their more recent vintage or on other features that are
deemed to trigger heightened scrutiny.
166. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
167. See, e.g., Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 5, at 295–97, 325 (discussing this unsettled
question).
168. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 546 (2005).
169. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing this expansion).
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included an option to pay money to gain permission to do a particular
project.170 But Koontz left pointedly unsettled whether legislative
enactments, which set out conditions (including monetary ones) in a
uniform and predictable manner, are subject to exactions scrutiny.171
Limiting the domain of exactions to administrative or adjudicative
bargaining—a path already taken by some states—would help to avoid
some of the uncertainty associated with the otherwise broad reach of
Koontz.172 For example, it would automatically exempt generally
applicable taxes and fees while leaving individually negotiated
monetary payments vulnerable to heightened exactions scrutiny.173
Such a limitation would also figure prominently in the analysis of
many other land use regulations, including inclusionary zoning
measures that offer developers the option of paying an “in-lieu fee”
rather than actually including affordable units in the development.
Although the California Supreme Court held in CBIA v. San Jose that
inclusionary zoning is simply a form of regulation, and not subject to
exactions analysis at all, the question has not yet been reached by the
Supreme Court.174 The ultimate fate of such laws may turn in part on
whether the Court decides to adopt the legislative/adjudicative
distinction to cabin the domain of exactions analysis. Yet the Court’s
latest pronouncement in Cedar Point—and potential governmental
responses to it—may complicate its ability to do so.
Significantly, Cedar Point seems to contemplate governmental
bodies using exactions analysis as a shield to save many routine access
grants from counting as takings. Governments may feel compelled to
take this lifeline and subject their legislative schemes involving physical
access to the essential nexus and rough proportionality requirements
of Nollan and Dolan. Similarly, if the prediction above about TahoeSierra is correct,175 they may soon be pushed to reach for the same

170. Justice Alito stated in Koontz that even one valid option would allow an exaction to pass
muster, but his analysis made the opposite point. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
570 U.S. 595, 611 (2013). The landowner in Koontz could have instead elected to conserve more
of his own land, yet the fact that he could avoid that concession through the option of paying
money doomed it in Alito’s eyes. But that’s always how alternatives work—doing one relieves
you of doing another—making it impossible for any one invalid option to avoid infecting all the
others on Alito’s reasoning.
171. See, e.g., Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 325 (noting this lacuna).
172. See, e.g., id. at 340–46 (discussing this distinction and its implications).
173. See id.
174. See CBIA v. San Jose, 351 P. 3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert denied, 577 U.S. 1179 (2016).
175. See discussion supra Part I.C.4 (predicting that the Supreme Court will overrule TahoeSierra to bring it in line with Cedar Point).
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lifeline to validate a wide range of short term restrictions on use, many
of which may be legislative in nature as well (including, for example,
waiting periods before evicting tenants). In so doing, are governments
resigning themselves to a world in which many more legislative
enactments regarding land use will be subject to this searching form of
heightened scrutiny?
If so, this lifeline works like a kind of trap, one that further advances
the creep—or march—of exactions into the heartland of land use
regulations.176 Yet presumably the Court wants to keep traditional
forms of zoning from receiving such scrutiny, since some of the most
widespread and deeply entrenched zoning classifications, such as
single-family-only residential zones, could not survive it. So we may see
some new annexes to the doctrine that attempt to selectively expose
laws to, and shield them from, the heightened scrutiny of exactions
analysis.
6. The Balance Beam (Penn Central)
Now we come at long last to the humble balance beam: the
government’s last best chance to get out of the escape room unscathed.
The default workhorse of implicit takings has long been the free-form
balancing test set out in Penn Central, which requires consideration of
three not-especially-definitive factors: the economic impact on the
landowner; interference with distinct, investment-backed expectations;
and the character of the government action.177

As the domains of per se tests and exactions analysis have
expanded, the remaining domain for Penn Central has shrunk
accordingly. That’s not an accident. Yet Penn Central is likely to
remain around for the foreseeable future because it offers a handy way
to deal with land use restrictions that the Court favors. A forgiving test
that is not sensitive to property value losses, Penn Central offers a
doctrinal alternative that can insulate from takings liability just about

176. Many land use controls are stated in sufficiently conditional terms as to be amenable to
this type of analysis. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 5, at 338. Although what is required of
the landowner would need to constitute a taking if simply confiscated on its own in order for
exactions analysis to apply, both Cedar Point and Koontz greatly expanded the categories of per
se takings.
177. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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anything that comes its way.178 At the same time, it could serve in a
pinch as a last-chance backstop, should anything that seems to impose
too heavily on property rights make it this far.
II. THE SELECTIVE SCRUTINY MACHINE
Now that we have worked our way through the twists and turns of
the implicit takings escape room, we can step back and take stock of
the system as a whole. This Part argues that the Court has created a
selective scrutiny machine designed to apply normative judgments
about property rights at every stage as it sorts, filters, and channels
property-impacting governmental acts through the maze of rules,
standards, and exceptions that make up the current (and future)
implicit takings framework. I will start with some general observations
about this method of formulating and packaging scrutiny, and then turn
to a functional remapping of the modes of analysis that feature in the
Court’s handiwork. We’ll end at the cash register, to discuss remedies.
A. Ends and Means
Cedar Point, I have argued, can be best understood as part of an
ongoing project of extending heightened scrutiny to regulations
impacting property rights—but not all such regulations. Instead, the
Court’s implicit takings jurisprudence is structured to selectively apply
scrutiny to property-impacting acts. But to what end has this apparatus
been constructed? What, exactly, is Court’s selective scrutiny machine
for? While it is impossible to know what motivates each Justice, we
might reasonably impute a broad orientation to Court’s current and
past conservative wings: maintenance of the status quo in general, and
its distribution of property wealth in particular.179 There is nothing
shocking about this goal; many would say this is precisely what property
law is meant to do. Yet pursuing this program in modern society
requires not only some means for attacking certain property-restrictive
laws but also some means of protecting other property-restrictive laws
178. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 7, at 62–66, 87–89 (finding that takings challenges rarely
succeed under Penn Central).
179. Notably, status quo preservation is not the same thing as wealth maximization. Zoning
often entrenches existing arrangements in service of the risk-averse preferences of homeowners,
even when departures from existing patterns would have a higher expected value for those same
homeowners. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 9–11 (2001)
(emphasizing the role of risk aversion in homeowner preferences and politics); see also Robert C.
Ellickson, The Zoning Straitjacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family
Homes, 96 IND. L.J. 395, 420–25 (2021) (discussing the significance of status quo bias in explaining
the ossification of single-family zones).
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from significant scrutiny.
Threading that needle is no mean feat. Making property rights
stronger across the board would threaten certain Court-favored
regulations, like single-family zoning.180 Implicit takings is muddled for
a reason: it’s tricky to target unwanted property regulations without
touching the ones deemed desirable. Significantly, the Court has not
elevated property to the status of a fundamental right, so that any acts
that impinge on an owner’s interests automatically receive a higher tier
of scrutiny.181 That would put zoning (and much else) on the chopping
block. Instead, it is using the trusty Takings Clause to crack down on
some, but not all, governmental acts impacting property rights. It is a
kind of scrutiny without tiers. And the aim, presumably, is scrutiny
without tears—to galvanize property rights without upsetting the
regulatory property infrastructure upon which landowners rely.
Cedar Point thus advances a line of doctrine that buffers owners
from certain kinds of garden-variety governmental acts by making
them more expensive to carry out (either because of the just
compensation requirement, the showings that are required to avoid it,
or some combination of the two). Yet at the same time, other pieces of
the Court’s implicit takings doctrine aim to protect land use restrictions
that would be threatened by heightened scrutiny—including much of
zoning.182 The Court, on this view, has tried to craft a Takings Clause
that can selectively attack and insulate government acts as needed to
protect status quo patterns of property wealth. But because it has not
been transparent about this goal, the doctrinal tests offer property
owners and governments little guidance—at least if taken at face value.

180. Exclusively single-family zones, despite their ubiquity, stand on doctrinally shaky
ground. See, e.g., Richard F. Babcock, The Egregious Invalidity of the Exclusive Single-Family
Zone, 35 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (1983). Even if a given zoning restriction could
ultimately survive elevated scrutiny, the costs of making the necessary showings could make such
regulation prohibitively expensive for many local governments. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra
note 5, at 351–52.
181. The Court has long employed a “tiers of scrutiny” approach in its constitutional
jurisprudence, with fundamental rights and suspect classifications receiving strict scrutiny, while
ordinary social and economic legislation receive only rational basis review; a limited
“intermediate scrutiny” category has also been recognized. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine? 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1077–80
(2011). The Court had at times used a verbal formulation suggesting heightened scrutiny
(“substantially advance legitimate state interests”) in some of its takings cases, but recanted in
Lingle, excising that test from its takings jurisprudence. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 540–45
(2005). See also Fenster, supra note 15 (discussing Lingle as it relates to the relationship between
takings and substantive due process).
182. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 4, at 351–52.
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Our difficulties evaporate, however, if we see implicit takings
doctrine as essentially justificatory, and instead ask whether the
property-facing law under consideration broadly supports or threatens
the status quo wealth structure. Some doctrinal features are more or
less explicit about this: reasonable expectations are the product of the
existing law; background principles are rooted in the past (which has a
particular distributive structure); and average reciprocity of advantage
asks whether the landowner is being effectively made whole (or better
than whole) by the operation of the same law. But where the intricate
detail of the various tests and exceptions does not point clearly to this
guiding principle, following the principle rather than the doctrine is
likely to yield better predictions.
This observation has a cynical, Legal Realist flavor. But how much
does a wealth-preserving goal diverge from what the Takings Clause is
meant to do? There is an intentionally counter-majoritarian bent to
takings protections, one that means to keep society at large from
expropriating wealth from the few.183 Accordingly, the Court’s
precedents have emphasized the need to keep governments from
placing unusually heavy burdens on particular landowners that should
instead be spread more broadly across society.184 But the Takings
Clause was never meant to stop government from governing, nor from
responding to—and producing—social change.185 Rectifying instances
in which owners are singled out for especially burdensome treatment is
a far more surgical and less comprehensive project than broadly
conserving existing patterns of property wealth. The latter project takes
us some distance from assessing how burdensome a government act is
for particular owners, and toward assessing whether the incidence of
the burdens overall tends to entrench or threaten existing property
wealth patterns.186
183. See, e.g., NEIL KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 94–97 (2001) (discussing compensation as a response to majoritarian bias).
184. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
185. Notably, Justice Holmes expressed concern in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon not just that
government be prevented from going “too far” without paying, but that government be permitted
to “go on.” See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.”).
186. This shift in orientation does not demand that regulations perfectly compensate owners
with reciprocal benefits in order to avoid a finding of a taking. Winners and losers are tolerated,
even when burdens are substantial, so long as the law does not systematically work against status
quo patterns. This is one way of understanding the Court’s decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
which upheld a zoning scheme that had the effect of reducing the value of some land by 75% but
promised to shield well-off homeowners from changing land use patterns. Vill. of Euclid v.
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Status quo maintenance, then, is a different and broader enterprise
than the alleviation of unusually concentrated burdens. Pursuing this
goal requires an instrument robust enough to reach even very minor
incursions that might leverage changes in existing hierarchies, but tame
enough to foster the restrictions that support those hierarchies. Put a
different way, it requires a mechanism for enabling and ratifying the
(generally robust) political power of homeowners and other wellheeled landowners, while at the same time constraining the political
power of those who might erode their holdings.187 An implicit takings
doctrine capable of serving this complex function needs a suite of tools
for fine-tuning the treatment that different property-impacting laws
receive. So let’s take a look.
B. A Functional Remapping
What would it mean to reconceptualize the implicit takings
framework as a selective scrutiny machine? In his section, I attempt a
remapping that translates Figure 2’s doctrinal rat’s nest into a set of
analytic modes that correspond to different levels of scrutiny. As noted
previously, some of those modes appear in more than one place in the
implicit takings map sketched in Figure 2; here I consolidate them and
note the various routes in and out.
1. Beyond the Pale (Non-Takings Scrutiny)
To start, not every imposition on property rights is a takings
problem. A government act must be otherwise legitimate, whether we
are talking about a use restriction or some kind of physical access, in
order for the liability rule regime contained in the Takings Clause to
be properly triggered.188 Wrongful or accidental acts may be violations
of the law, or of other constitutional provisions, but they are not
takings, because they cannot be validated by just compensation. These
“beyond the pale” incursions empty out into other realms of scrutiny,

Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
187. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 179 (emphasizing the political power of homeowners); see
also Farber, supra note 5, at 159–61 (observing, following public choice theory, that landowners
bearing concentrated burdens will often wield more political power than the general public
receiving diffuse benefits).
188. See supra Parts I.B.2 and I.C.1.
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outside of the scope of takings concern.
2. Background Principles (No Scrutiny)
We can also dispense with any government action that merely
instantiates background principles, which represent inherent limits on
title.189 This again is true whether we are talking about physical access
or use restrictions. While Cedar Point has put a lot of pressure on
background principles, whatever goes in this box slides free and clear
to the “not a taking” endpoint. Unlike “beyond the pale” acts, which
were not legitimate enough to be takings, “background” acts get
ejected from the takings inquiry because they involve entitlements that
never belonged to the landowner in the first place.190 Once an act
qualifies as a background principle, it receives no further takings
scrutiny.191
3. Penn Central (Low Scrutiny)
Penn Central remains, for the moment, the dominant test for use
restrictions.192 Use restrictions that do not rise to the level of a total
taking under Lucas are analyzed here.193 The Penn Central test will
likely also continue to serve as a fallback test for any physical
incursions that slip out of Cedar Point’s per se grasp though an opendoor theory like the one used to distinguish PruneYard.194 However, the
open-door theory often embeds a form of conditionality that begins to
resemble the exactions structure.195 This conceptual adjacency could
create permeability running in either direction, allowing some
conditional encroachments to be handled as Penn Central cases via the
open-door theory, and others to be handled as exactions cases.
4. Exactions (High Scrutiny)
Exactions receive a heightened level of scrutiny that goes far
beyond the usual standard for social and economic legislation.196 Any

189. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text supra Part I.B.3.
190. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–31 (1992).
191. A possible caveat is discussed above, if the background principle is understood to bake
in some additional takings test. See supra note 109.
192. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the Penn Central test); see
supra Part I.C.6 (discussing Penn Central’s current applicability).
193. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the Lucas “total takings” rule).
194. See supra Part I.B.5.
195. See text accompanying notes 71–72, supra.
196. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.
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government acts routed through this alternative will have to prove up
essential nexus and rough proportionality.197 The typical predicate for
exactions scrutiny would be a proffered exchange of a discretionary
governmental benefit like a building permit for a concession that would
otherwise be a taking on its own. Yet if the benefits in question are
implicit ones, and the exchange is tacit in nature, there may be the
potential to handle the case under Penn Central based on the kind of
open-door reasoning that the Cedar Point Court used to distinguish
PruneYard.
There is another caveat. After Cedar Point, some land use
restrictions may no longer be candidates for bargain-making, even if
the exactions requirements are fulfilled, because the uses in question
are too “basic and familiar” to require anything in exchange.198
Concessions tied to relaxing restrictions on such uses will, therefore,
just be takings.
5. Per Se Rules (Infinitely High Scrutiny)
Per se rules might be characterized as involving infinitely high
scrutiny, inasmuch as the conclusion of a taking cannot be avoided at
all, no matter how weighty the government interest involved.199 There
are exceptions to these rules, but none of the exceptions track the
importance of the government interest as such, and hence do not call
upon courts to weigh or balance interests.200 As these observations
suggest, the real work goes into determining whether the per se rule
applies or not. This sorting process represents a type of heightened
scrutiny in itself, one that now runs the full length and breadth of all
physical incursions,201 and which may in time be extended to the total
197. See supra note 39.
198. See supra notes 124–134 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071–73 (2021) (discussing the
categorical operation of the per se rule for physical takings, which does not involve any balancing
or weighing of government interests); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992) (describing the rule for permanent physical invasions, which requires compensation
“no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it”);
id. at 1028–29 (setting out a similarly categorical rule for government acts that eliminate all
economic value unless the limitation was inherent in the owner’s title).
200. The “background principles” exception requires examining the historical provenance of
the government act. See supra Part I.B.3. The exactions exception requires considering the act’s
place in any bargain that the government is striking. See supra Parts I.B.4 and I.C.5. Other
exceptions ask whether some other feature of the act (its status as a tort, or its interaction with
the owner’s decision to open up the property) pulls it outside of the per se rule. See supra Parts
I.B.1 and I.B.2. Although a very weighty government interest would presumably influence how
courts interpret and apply the exceptions, it is not an explicit part of the analysis.
201. See supra Part I.B.
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taking of time slices and perhaps of other functionally or spatially
defined subsets of property holdings.202 The complexity of the doctrinal
inquiry raises the costs and risks of lawmaking around property
rights.203
6. Taking Stock
The scrutiny categories outlined above have something surprising
in common: they all apply, at least to some extent, in both the physical
and use restriction sectors of the implicit takings inquiry.204 Thus the
first question in Figure 2’s flow chart, which asks whether the
encroachment is physical in nature, neither rules out nor in any
particular mode of analysis—even though Cedar Point seems to make
it the most significant single question that might be asked in an implicit
takings discussion. This does not mean that both kinds of alleged
takings are treated alike—they obviously aren’t—but rather that we
can stand back a bit from the busy detail of Figure 2’s attempt at
faithfully mapping the doctrine and offer a different, more functional,
way of understanding the field. Figure 3 illustrates.205

202. See supra Part I.C.4.
203. See generally Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 75 (2016)
(discussing the risks that implicit takings doctrines create for local governments).
204. A borderline case is the Penn Central analysis, which the Court may have meant to excise
from its physical takings jurisprudence altogether. Although it seems likely to have a continuing
role with respect to some physical incursions that qualify for an exception to the per se rule, it is
possible that subjecting them to lighter scrutiny under Penn Central will come with a justificatory
recharacterization of the act as really only regulatory in nature. See infra Part I.B.5.
205. I created Figure 3 based on my reading of Cedar Point and the Court’s prior takings case
law. It is organized around the levels of scrutiny spelled out in the current section, Part II.B, which
distill and remap the doctrinal analysis examined in Part I, supra.
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Rather than starting with the doctrinal distinction between physical
takings and use restrictions, or even the distinction between per se rules
and Penn Central’s amorphous balancing test, Figure 3 inverts the
analysis by starting with the exceptions and working down through
layers of scrutiny until finally, at the bottom of the chart, we reach the
per se rules. Figure 3 thus works through a stack of four questions that
collectively determine the level of scrutiny that a given governmental
act will receive.
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The first question in Figure 3 tosses out government acts that aren’t
viable candidates as takings because they aren’t legitimate. These
“beyond the pale” acts receive non-takings scrutiny. This includes onetime trespasses, ultra vires actions, corrupt dealings, and much more.
Although these land in the “not a taking” box, that doesn’t mean the
governmental entity or actor might not be in a heap of trouble for other
reasons. We’re just talking about takings here.
Figure 3’s second question seeks to identify background principles,
which will receive no scrutiny. This question implicates high-stakes
normative and practical judgments. If something is a background
principle, that’s the end of the story, and it’s “not a taking,” all the way
down.
Next, we come to a question that asks about all the flavors of
conditionality. Depending on the answer, we may go into a highscrutiny environment (exactions) or a low-scrutiny environment (Penn
Central), or continue on toward an infinite scrutiny environment (per
se rules). As the discussion above suggests, there is not yet any
definitive guidance on how different varieties of conditionality will be
treated. But exactions scrutiny should only be triggered by a concession
that would constitute a taking on its own.206
We get to per se rules only at the bottom of the chart, because they
are not really per se rules until we know that there is no applicable
exception. Figure 3’s final question thus asks whether we are dealing
with a physical incursion under Cedar Point that has made it past all
the above exceptions or a total taking situation under Lucas that also
survived the prior inquiries, including the question of background
principles. The answer determines whether we are in the infinite
scrutiny realm of a per se taking, or pitched out into the residual Penn
Central category.
Because so many judgment calls go into how a particular fact
scenario would move among the boxes, Figure 3 cannot really help
anyone determine how their takings case will come out. It can only
offer a snapshot of the way pockets of scrutiny are distributed through
the inquiry and baked into the sorting process itself. It does, however,
expose the pressure points upon which a taking case turns.

206. This does raise the possibility that the concession component of the situation might need
to first be subjected to its own solo run through the chart to see if it is a taking, in order to
determine if the bargain should fall into the exactions box. This layer of analysis is built into the
conclusion that we are dealing with an exactions situation.
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Of course, Figure 3 is just one possible mapping of the Court’s
selective scrutiny machine. Further developments in the lower courts
or future pronouncements by the Court may rearrange some of the
pieces or amend their content in various ways. What seems most certain
and least likely to change, however, is the sheer versatility of the
machine, and its inclusion of many and varied implements for assessing
incursions on property. It contains enough tests, exceptions, rules,
standards, qualifiers, and escape hatches to provide whatever degree of
scrutiny might be desired in a given situation. But how effective it will
be in delivering on the broad goals I have imputed to the Court
depends crucially on the applicable remedies.
C. The Cash Register (Just Compensation)
After spending so much time bumbling about in the Court’s implicit
takings structure, it can be easy to forget that there is a simple and wellmarked way out of the labyrinth: paying just compensation.207 The mix
of exceptions laid out in Cedar Point offers several opportunities for
governments to argue that their legislation survives its trip through the
scrutiny machine. But in many cases, paying is likely to be cheaper and
less risky than attempting to make the necessary showings.208
Properly understood, the Takings Clause is not about stopping
illegitimate government acts; it is only about requiring the payment of
just compensation for legitimate government acts.209 Thus, any
expansion in the domain of implicit takings involves a tacit concession:
that the governmental act in question counts as a public use that can be
validated by payment.210 It is impossible to impose just compensation
207. This assumes, of course, that the act is question is otherwise legitimate and thus capable
of being validated by payment. Although some commentators have suggested that access
restrictions unaccompanied by compensation mechanisms might be enjoined, see Bowie, supra
note 67, at 199–200, the governmental actor could avoid that result by simply providing for
compensation—something the Takings Clause plainly permits them to do.
208. This is especially true where exactions analysis constitutes the only other plausible way
out. Even an ultimate “no taking” result may prove more costly to the government than simply
paying just compensation if it is achieved through a route that includes, in addition to litigation,
the costs of proving up nexus and proportionality. Moreover, going all-in on the exactions escape
route may end up conceding the applicability of the framework to a broader set of restrictions
than had previously been recognized—a bad result for government.
209. The notion that the requirement to pay compensation might force a government to
internalize more of the costs of its actions and therefore choose its actions more carefully (a claim
that may or may not be empirically supported in a given context) is not inconsistent with this
observation.
210. The fact that some states have adopted more stringent “public use” requirements than
the Court has applied to the federal Takings Clause introduces an interesting wrinkle.
Presumably, a state or local governmental access law that fails on public use grounds at the state
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obligations without acknowledging the governmental power that lies
behind them.211 So California can keep its labor access law in place if it
pays just compensation for the impingement on the property right in
question. Importantly, it need not compensate for whatever economic
leverage the growers think they might lose if the workers succeed in
organizing; that has nothing to do with the property encroachment, but
rather involves labor market power dynamics that the landowner has
no legitimate right to control.212
The relevant figure may turn out to be pretty low. The
constitutional standard for just compensation is the fair market value
of the property interest in question.213 While the labor access grant does
not seem to fit neatly into any property category recognized under state
law,214 the rental value of the land offers at least a rough point of
level could be enjoined, even if it would otherwise meet the federal public use standard that would
make it a compensable taking. See Fennell, supra note 88, at 78–79 (discussing possible ways of
resolving the conflict between state and federal public use standards). Because these state law
standards were developed prior to Cedar Point, when no one thought that brief grants of access
counted as takings, their applicability to this context is unclear. I thank David Schleicher for
discussions on this point.
211. Justice Kennedy made an analogous point in his concurrence in Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010). Although the plurality plainly
saw judicial takings as a way to constrain judicial power, Kennedy observed that recognizing
judicial takings implies a judicial power to take. See id at 736–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
212. Put another way, whatever rights the growers may have in their property does not
include a right to keep labor from organizing effectively. If the presence of union representatives
on the property is indeed essential to the workers’ capacity to organize, so that property access is
a but-for cause of unionization, then this merely implies (contra the distinction drawn to the
Babcock line) that there was in fact no other way to reach workers. That might cast doubt on the
Court’s analysis, but it cannot possibly give the landowners the right to claim compensation equal
to the economic effects of unionization. But see Bowie, supra note 67, at 198–99 (“In the case of
an access rule, the Court could hold that just compensation for allowing union organizers on
company property isn’t the nominal value of each trespass, but the consequential value of the
profits a company’s shareholders might lose to workers if they were to unionize and demand
higher wages.”). While perhaps the Court could hold this way, doing so would run counter to
logic, doctrine, and the rule of law.
213. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (describing the
fair market value standard that constitutes the Court’s general rule for eminent domain
compensation).
214. It seems most akin to an easement, but the parties disputed whether it qualified as one
under state law. However, the Court found the question irrelevant, observing that there can be a
compensable taking even when “the government’s intrusion does not vest it with an property
interest recognized by state law, such as a fee simple or a leasehold.” Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2076 (2021). Perhaps the closest analogue recognized under California
law would be a “floating easement,” which is defined functionally and is not initially fixed in space,
although the parties can later establish its location. See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co. v.
Severns, 252 Cal. Rptr.3d 667, 673 (2019) (“Some expressly granted easements—commonly
known as ‘floating easements’—are not specifically defined as to location by the creating
conveyance.”).
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reference. According to American Farm Bureau numbers, the average
annual cash rental rate for an acre of California cropland was $439 in
2020.215 A generous estimate for the space occupied by a standing
person is 8 or 9 square feet, but let’s count a quarter acre of space as
potentially occupied by the labor organizers, just to account for any
wandering around they may do. That gets us to $109.75—for a whole
year. California’s regulation allowed labor organizers to be present
three hours per day, 120 days per year, for a total of 360 hours out of
the 8760 hours in a year—a little over four percent. That works out to
a cash value of $4.51.216
Landowners might challenge this calculation on any number of
grounds. For one thing, California’s regulation entitles the organizers
to access “areas in which employees congregate before and after
working” or, during the lunch hour, “at such location or locations as the
employees eat their lunch.”217 Depending on the layout of the work site,
accessing these areas might require traversing some additional land of
the growers. Even if the total square footage taken up by the organizers
aggregates to no more than the posited quarter acre for the time
allotted, the mobility of the organizers plausibly increases their
intrusiveness.218 But there are important limits to this argument. The
owners can presumably control where the workers congregate and eat
lunch, and should not be able to drive up the just compensation award
by needlessly moving these areas far into the interior of their property
to increase the amount of real estate implicated. Nor should the
compensation award include any disruption to work that results from
organizers violating the limits contained in the regulation.219 While such
disruptions may be separately actionable as violations of the regulation,
they are not part of the governmental grant of access.220

215. No Change in Land Values for 2020, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION (Aug.
11, 2020), https://www.fb.org/market-intel/no-change-in-land-values-for-2020.
216. This figure is lower than, but not too far off from, Justice Barrett’s hypothetical of “50
bucks” as just compensation during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 70, Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid (U.S. argued March 22, 2021) (No.20-107).
217. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 20900(e)(3) (2020).
218. By analogy, storing bowling balls in a fixed location is a much different thing than rolling
them all around a worksite, even if the volume of space occupied over a unit of time is the same
in the aggregate in both cases.
219. The access regulation prohibits “conduct disruptive of the employer’s property or
agricultural operations, including injury to crops or machinery or interference with the process of
boarding buses.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 20900(e)(4)(C) (2020).
220. Cf. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 239 (2003) (observing that
no just compensation would be due if clients lost interest due to violations of the rules governing
IOLTA accounts, because such losses would be “the consequence of . . . incorrect private
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The agricultural rental value is also presumably far less than what
a grower would actually charge an organizer for the right to hang
around the worksite. But the Takings Clause entitles the government
to a liability rule solution. That rules out having to pay the full
reservation price that an owner would demand—a point made clear by
compensation protocols for eminent domain.221 Whatever the merits
of increasing compensation to account for losses that might go
uncompensated by fair market value,222 it would be highly incongruous
to adopt such an approach in the context of temporary grants of
physical access but not in the case of full-on eminent domain. Further,
just compensation equates to what the owner loses, not what the
government gains.223 Here the owner loses temporary control over
some bits of land that are agricultural in character, even if the specific
square feet in question would not likely be cultivated in any case.224
A more persuasive basis for higher compensation would be that by
taking a small bit of physical access, the government has damaged or
devalued the whole property, or at least a significant subset of it.225 A
remedy proposed by Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky for
partial takings would grant the landowner a put option enabling her to
force the government to take (and pay for) the whole thing or nothing
at all.226 Yet Bell and Parchomovsky recognize a de minimis exception
for minute permanent physical occupations of the sort at issue in
Loretto—and, presumably, would extend that exception to the other
very limited invasions that are now subject to the per se rule under

decisions rather than any state action”).
221. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 962–67 (2004) (discussing the components of an “uncompensated increment” confiscated
through exercises of eminent domain).
222. See Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent
Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013) (surveying and criticizing a number of arguments along
these lines); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109 (2013)
(responding to Lee).
223. Brown, 538 U.S. at 236–37.
224. If the organizers simply use the same uncultivated parts of the worksite that the workers
use for congregating and eating, there may be no measurable loss of the use of land at all. On the
other hand, if the periodic presence of the organizers requires the areas set aside for worker
breaks to be incrementally larger than they otherwise would be, then a corresponding increment
of agricultural land might become unavailable for cultivation at any time. In the latter situation,
the compensation should not be pro-rated based on the hours of presence, though presumably far
less than a quarter acre would be added to the break areas to accommodate a few visiting
organizers.
225. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 2043 (2017).
226. Id. at 2046.
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Cedar Point.227 It might indeed seem excessive to give a grower
inconvenienced by a labor organizer access requirement the right to
force the state of California to buy its whole farm. Nonetheless, the
underlying logic of the argument—that disruption of a portion can
damage more than just that portion—might lead to higher
compensation awards in cases where minor but disruptive interruptions
make the owner less able to use the balance of her property.
Exactions add another wrinkle to the remedial story. While land use
exactions involve a demanded concession that would be a taking on its
own, owners may or may not agree to the deal. If they refuse and
challenge the bargain, no taking has actually occurred, yet there may
be some other remedy for the attempted exchange.228 Thus, the
conclusion that a taking was attempted (successfully or not) through
improper pressure may result in forms of liability different from just
compensation. Characterizing access requirements as exactions is not
only an imperfect mechanism for avoiding payment obligations, given
the rigors and risks of exactions scrutiny, it could even complicate the
ability to simply pay for the access.
However, paying for every instance of access has some downsides.
The potential expense of doing so is one consideration, although the
payment itself is just a wealth transfer among taxpayers that may or
may not have political repercussions.229 We must also be concerned with
the administrative costs of calculating and carrying out the payments—
”settlement costs” in Frank Michelman’s schema.230 A deeper problem
is that conceding an implicit taking sets a precedent for future actions,
which may create a ratchet effect.231 Paying compensation in a given
setting may make it more difficult to later argue that the same or similar
interactions should be immunized from takings liability by background
principles or some version of an open-door theory.
There may also be an ingrained reluctance on the part of
227. Id. at 2080–81.
228. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S., 608–09 (2013) (observing
that if there is no consummated bargain and hence no taking, the remedy of just compensation
does not apply but the exaction can still amount to an unconstitutional burden to be remedied in
accordance with whatever state or federal cause of action the landowner sued under).
229. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (observing that governments
respond to political rather than financial incentives).
230. See Michelman, supra note 143.
231. Cf. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (making an analogous “ratchet” argument in the intellectual property
context).
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governmental entities to pay for takings, pushing them to reflexively
withdraw the offending regulation. This, certainly, was Oregon’s
experience with Measure 37, which (before it was largely gutted by the
subsequent enactment of Measure 49) required compensation for, or
waiver of, land use regulations enacted after the owner acquired the
land that diminished property values.232 Almost invariably, the
government waived the regulation.233 Accordingly, we might worry that
governments will substitute less effective regulatory measures for ones
that rely on physical access in order to avoid having to hemorrhage a
constant stream of payments.
Yet challenges may be few and far between if the amounts to be
gained are trivial and the government shows no inclination to drop the
measure in question—typically, the true goal of the landowner bringing
the challenge. Hence, precommitting to paying just compensation,
perhaps by setting aside resources earmarked for this purpose, might
prove a valuable strategic move. While it is impossible to predict the
modal governmental response to Cedar Point, and any generalizations
are bound to be wrong in a nation containing tens of thousands of
governmental bodies, one interesting question is whether the response
to Cedar Point will influence the course of future takings cases. If the
Court’s elaborate scrutiny machine turns out to be nothing but a
byzantine coin-operated turnstile, further reworkings of the implicit
takings escape room may start to seem less appealing.
In sum, stopping off at the cash register under the lighted exit sign
to pay just compensation may be a viable option for the government in
many contexts.234 The availability of an often-trivial compensation
alternative to the onerous strictures of meeting heightened scrutiny or
the social costs of abandoning long-established policies may make
Cedar Point less consequential than it initially seems.235 It also makes it
232. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1286–95 (2009) (recounting the history of
Measure 37’s enactment and demise).
233. See id. at 1284 (2009) (“In only one claim, out of the over 7000 Measure 37 claims filed,
did the state or municipality choose to compensate the property owners rather than waive the
regulation.”).
234. Although this option is straightforward for legislative and regulatory acts, the prospect
of judicial takings raises additional, difficult remedial questions, as has been well explored
elsewhere. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 RICH. L. REV.
903, 953–58 (2011); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due
Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (2012); Fennell, supra note 88, at 111–14; Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1513–22 (1990).
235. Although Cedar Point greatly expanded the circumstances in which trivial payments
might be due for takings, the phenomenon did not start with that case. See Loretto v.
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less clear what the Court was really up to. Perhaps, for at least some
members of the majority, the goal was not really to curtail policies like
California’s or meaningfully advance the interests of property owners,
but rather to strike an expressive, symbolic blow for property rights.236
The decision is sure to cast a long shadow, but how much it will change
life on the ground is less clear.237
CONCLUSION
Cedar Point, the Court’s new entry in the compendium of implicit
takings cases, advances a line of doctrine that applies selective scrutiny
to property-impacting laws and regulations. Significantly, the Court
does not ratchet up the degree of scrutiny that applies across the board.
Rather, it concocts a convoluted set of tests that seem baffling on the
surface, but that effectively carve out certain kinds of property
regulations to receive low levels of review while others receive intense
scrutiny and come at a price premium.
This way of proceeding has its drawbacks, even for the Court. It is
conceptually incoherent. It opens up a welter of essentially
unanswerable questions about the nature and content of background
limits on title, what kinds of door-openings imply what sorts of
obligations, what types of bargains do and do not put unacceptable
pressure on the right to just compensation, and where the lines
surrounding per se categories really fall—the answers to which may
carry unintended consequences. And, because takings analysis
presupposes legitimate government action for which compensation
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983) (upholding, on remand from the
Supreme Court, the adequacy of the statutory scheme for setting compensation for the
encroachment of the cable box and wires, which had provided for a one-time payment of $1, as
described in the court’s earlier proceeding, 423 N.E.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. 1981)); Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003) (holding that plaintiffs were due zero
compensation for the taking of interest from pooled IOLTA accounts, since the plaintiffs would
not have been able to realize any interest absent the pooling).
236. Cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 61–62 (1995) (suggesting that the
property rights victory in Nollan served a similarly symbolic role for pro-development interests
notwithstanding the fact that it might actually work to their disadvantage by taking some potential
bargains off the table).
237. It may even prove counterproductive to the cause of property rights protection. See
Farber, supra note 8 (predicting that the effects of enlarged categorical “background norm”
exceptions will outstrip the effects of the Court’s new per se rule in the physical invasion cases);
see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89 (describing the unexpected consequences of the
development of categorical “background principles” exceptions following Lucas). Cf. Timothy
M. Mulvaney, The State of Exactions, 61 WM. & MARY 169, 173 (2019) (finding, based on
reviewing the 130 lower court cases decided post-Koontz, “that Koontz’s footprint is thus far
rather light”).

FENNELL_4_9_22_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/6/2022 11:11 AM

ESCAPE ROOM

61

serves as full validation, it cannot really give property rights advocates
what they most crave, which is the ability to actually stop incursions
from happening.
What, then, does the Court understand itself to be doing? Cedar
Point might be read as a symbolic blow for property rights, a show of
strength in this domain by the new conservative supermajority. Yet the
view of property rights it vindicates is far from absolute; it is instead
rooted in a tradition of status quo wealth preservation that owes as
much to state action as it does to its restraint. The Cedar Point majority
likely finds this way of understanding property rights to be natural and
straightforward—and if it takes a funhouse full of mirrors and a
gauntlet of unanswerable riddles to make the doctrine fit the vision,
well, so much the worse for the doctrine.238 Wittingly or not, the Court
has created an analytic environment in which every seemingly fixed
point of reference offers not a true foothold or useful signpost, but only
another nested puzzle. This essay does not purport to have found any
of the solutions, but it aims to provoke thought about the point of the
puzzle making.

238. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8 (observing that the Court, through its regulatory takings
jurisprudence, “has created a house of mirrors, a maze in which nothing is as it seems”).

